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MAKING FEDERALISM WORK: LESSONS FROM
HEALTH CARE FOR THE GREEN NEW DEAL
Jesse M. Cross *
Shelley Welton **
For decades, federalism had a bad reputation. It often was perceived as little more than a cover for state resistance to civil rights
and other social justice reforms. More recently, however, progressive
scholars have argued that federalism can meaningfully advance
nationalist ends. According to these scholars, federalism allows for
spaces in which norms can be contested, developed, and extended.
This new strain of scholarship also recognizes, however, that these
federalist structures can still shield national-level reforms from
reaching all Americans. Many see such gaps as a regrettable but
unavoidable feature of our federalist system.
But to embrace federalism as an important component of the U.S.
legal architecture does not mean that one must abandon efforts to
craft effective federalist programs. To the contrary, this Article argues that the scholarly coalescence around the virtues of federalism
raises a pressing new question: are there ways to structure federalist
programs that help to build constituencies and participation over
time? That is, for those who accept federalism but are committed to
expanding essential services and goods to all Americans, how can
policymakers best make federalism work?
To answer this question, the Article analyzes an important case
study in modern federalism: the Affordable Care Act. We argue that
the ACA experience offers three critical lessons about how to structure modern, federalist social justice legislation that both respects
states as partners and builds effectively toward national norms.
These lessons involve (1) the new importance of federal program
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** Associate Professor, University of South Carolina School of Law. The authors would
like to thank Morgan Hylton for outstanding research assistance, as well as the editors at
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765

CROSS WELTON 553 (DO NOT DELETE)

766

4/22/2021 8:52 AM

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:765

“backstops,” (2) the need to create unusual coalitions, and (3) the
counterintuitive benefits of building upon entrenched statutory programs.
These lessons from the ACA should, we assert, help architects and
scholars of new legislative efforts better understand how to make
federalism work to achieve social justice ends today. To illustrate
how, the Article concludes by applying these lessons to the Green
New Deal—the vibrant new legislative effort to jointly tackle climate change and inequality.
INTRODUCTION
Many on the left have long been skeptical of federalism. Based
on its association with state resistance to nationally imposed civil
rights reforms, skeptics have viewed federalism as little more than
a rhetorical device to advance recalcitrance and obstructionism.1
But recently, scholars sympathetic to social justice ends have
called for a “détente” in the federalism–nationalism debate, arguing that federalism often serves to enhance projects aimed at
achieving greater social justice.2 These “new school” federalism
scholars3 have argued that federalism provides generative spaces
1. Noting this trend, Sara Mayeux and Karen Tani observe that a “common [perception] among U.S. historians generally” has been that “invocations of federalism [in the twentieth century] must have been pretexts for reactionary political projects—whether undoing
the gains of Reconstruction and the civil rights movement (federalism as synonymous with
‘states’ rights’), or rationalizing libertarian opposition to economic regulation.” Sara Mayeux
& Karen Tani, Federalism Anew, 56 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 128, 130 (2016); see also Erwin
Chemerinsky, The Values of Federalism, 47 FLA. L. REV. 499, 534 (1995) (“Unfortunately,
too often careful analysis has been absent and federalism has been used as a slogan or as a
guise to hide the real issue in dispute. For example, during the debate over civil rights in
the 1950s and 1960s, opponents talked about federalism and states’ rights rather than the
real issue: racial equality.”).
2. See Heather K. Gerken, Federalism and Nationalism: Time for a Détente?, 59 ST.
LOUIS L. REV. 997, 997 (2015); Heather K. Gerken, Federalism 3.0, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1695,
1697 (2017) [hereinafter Gerken, Federalism 3.0]; Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1081 (2014) (offering “a sympathetic rendering of partisan
federalism,” for its role in allowing states to “check the federal government by channeling
partisan conflict through federalism’s institutional framework”); Heather K. Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism: An Overview, 123 YALE L.J. 1889, 1889–91 (2014) (synthesizing the work of the “nationalist school of federalism” that celebrates federalism’s ability
to serve nationalist ends, and arguing that debates about devolution and centralization are
“means to the same end: a well-functioning democracy”); Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 317 (1997) (“[W]e have made too little effort to value (weigh or
measure) the worth of the values (ideals) federalism is said to serve.”).
3. See Abbe R. Gluck & Nicole Huberfeld, What Is Federalism in Healthcare For?, 70
STAN. L. REV. 1689, 1694 (2018) (using this terminology).
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for such projects, creating “sites where we battle over—and forge—
national policy, national politics, and national norms.”4 Examples
that validate this theory are easy to come by: consider how early
state and local action built to the Supreme Court’s sanctioning of
gay marriage,5 or how states and localities have achieved substantial climate change policies in the absence of a national consensus.6
This new strain of scholarship also recognizes, however, that in
certain cases federalist structures still shield national-level reforms from reaching all Americans. Perhaps the most significant
modern example of this phenomenon is the landmark 2010 statute
designed to expand Americans’ access to health care, the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA” or the “Act”).7 The ACA
takes a cooperative federalism approach to its mission, enlisting
the states as partners in health care expansion.8 Consequently,
certain states resistant to its goals have been able to block its full
implementation within their borders, leaving millions of Americans uninsured—not to mention the 15,600 deaths that a 2019
study attributed to state non-expansion decisions.9
The response of the new school federalists to these kinds of lamentable gaps has been to point out that they are, themselves, the
result of contested norms at the national level. National norms, in
this view, must be built and earned in our federalist system from

4. See Gerken, Federalism 3.0, supra note 2, at 1696 (emphasis omitted).
5. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 744–47 (2013) (holding that the Defense of
Marriage Act, denying federal recognition of same-sex marriage, violated due process); see
Molly Ball, How Gay Marriage Became a Constitutional Right, ATLANTIC (July 1, 2015),
www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/07/gay-marriage-supreme-court-politics-activis
m/397052/ [https://perma.cc/R9QA-VNZH].
6. See Katrina M. Wyman & Danielle Spiegel-Feld, The Urban Environmental Renaissance, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 305, 307 (2020); Shelley Welton, Public Energy, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV.
267, 267 (2017); Uma Outka, Cities and the Low-Carbon Grid, 46 ENVTL. L. 105, 105 (2016);
Jim Rossi, Carbon Taxation by Regulation, 102 MINN. L. REV. 277, 280–81 (2017); Vicki
Arroyo, From Paris to Pittsburgh: U.S. State and Local Leadership in an Era of Trump, 31
GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. 433, 433 (2019); Richard B. Stewart, States and Cities as Actors in
Global Climate Regulation: Unitary vs. Plural Architectures, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 681, 681
(2008); Katherine A. Trisolini, All Hands on Deck: Local Governments and the Potential for
Bidirectional Climate Change Regulation, 62 STAN. L. REV. 669, 669 (2010).
7. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.).
8. See infra Part I.
9. Sarah Miller, Norman Johnson & Laura R. Wherry, Medicaid and Mortality: New
Evidence from Linked Survey and Administrative Data 2–3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 26081, 2021), https://www.nber.org/papers/w26081 [https://perma.cc/AZ
S6-FXZ5].
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the ground up.10 If a national movement is strong enough, it can
override federalist tendencies and pass legislation that mandates
a national program, as would proposals for Medicare for All in the
health care context.11 But thus far, Medicare for All has not been
able to pass Congress—only the ACA has—suggesting that the
norms in favor of health insurance for all are not cohesive enough
yet for a nationally comprehensive program.
This response strikes us both as (a) essentially correct and (b)
cold comfort for the millions of Americans living in states that have
denied them access to health care. Thus, in our view, the scholarly
coalescence around federalism’s virtues raises a pressing new
question for scholars and policymakers alike: are there ways to
structure federalist programs that help to build constituencies and
participation over time? That is, for those who accept federalism
for either political or normative reasons but are committed to expanding essential services and goods to all Americans, how can policymakers best make federalism work?
This question is pressing across issue areas that implicate
shared federal–state administration of welfare-enhancing policies—which is to say, the vast majority of the modern administrative state.12 As a lens into answering it, we focus on the ACA, considering how its cooperative federalist structures have fared in
10. See Gerken, Federalism 3.0, supra note 2, at 1710 (“Academics often unthinkingly
blame decentralization for shortfalls in our equality norms. This simplistic formulation ignores the fact that the turn to decentralization is a sign of weakness in the norms themselves.”).
11. See, e.g., Medicare for All Act of 2019, S. 1129, 116th Cong. (2019); Medicare for All
Act of 2019, H.R. 1384, 116th Cong. (2019). For an overview of the 2020 Democratic presidential candidates’ stances on Medicare for All proposals, see Alice Miranda Ollstein, 2020
Candidates’ Views on Medicare for All: A Voter’s Guide, POLITICO (Feb. 9, 2020), https:
//www.politico.com/2020-election/candidates-views-on-the-issues/health-care/medicare-forall/ [https://perma.cc/7K5A-RCCB].
12. See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 2, at 1083 (“[T]he states and the federal government
increasingly regulate in overlapping areas rather than separate spheres.”); Heather K.
Gerken, The Federalis(m) Society, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 941, 942 (2013) (“Cooperative
federalism is where the action is. It is where the future is.”); Abbe R. Gluck, Intrastatutory
Federalism and Statutory Interpretation: State Implementation of Federal Law in Health
Reform and Beyond, 121 YALE L.J. 534, 538 (2011) (tracing the historical arc of cooperative
federalism); Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1, 23 (1950)
(observing how the New Deal “converted [federalism] into an instrument for the achievement of . . . economic security for ‘the common man’”); see also JON D. MICHAELS,
CONSTITUTIONAL COUP: PRIVATIZATION’S THREAT TO THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 39–50 (2017)
(tracing the rise of the modern administrative state since the New Deal); Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The “Reformation of Administrative Law” Revisited, 31 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 782, 782 (2015) (arguing that “beginning in the 1960’s . . . new techniques of
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building toward the Act’s goal of comprehensive health insurance.
The ACA is not exemplary in its federalist structures, but it is the
lone piece of major social justice legislation passed in the preceding
decade. That makes it a rare case study of how to structure federalist programs in our modern, hyperpartisan era,13 with its attendant congressional gridlock.14
Although the ACA’s coverage remains incomplete, regulators
have built creatively toward the Act’s goals in the face of judicial
challenges and state recalcitrance, slowly cajoling states into cooperation and thus bringing health insurance to tens of millions more
Americans.15 The Act is certainly not an unqualified success, but it

regulatory policymaking reconfigured the relationship between the national and state governments”).
13. On hyperpartisanship, see Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The
Causes of Hyperpolarized Democracy in America, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 273, 273 (2011) (“Over
the last generation, American democracy has had one defining attribute: extreme partisan
polarization.”); Joseph Fishkin & Heather K. Gerken, The Two Trends That Matter for Party
Politics, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 32, 33 (2014) (“The divide between the parties in terms
of both ideology and voting patterns is deeper and clearer than it has been for at least sixty
years.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Partyism, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 2. On climate change and
hyperpartisanship, see Oliver Milman, Climate Crisis More Politically Polarizing Than
Abortion for US Voters, Study Finds, GUARDIAN (May 22, 2019, 1:00 AM), https://www.the
guardian.com/us-news/2019/may/21/climate-crisis-more-politically-polarizing-than-abortio
n-for-us-voters-study-finds [https://perma.cc/K4EV-MCZC].
14. Michael J. Teter, Gridlock, Legislative Supremacy, and the Problem of Arbitrary
Inaction, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2217 (2013); Josh Chafetz, The Phenomenology of Gridlock, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2065 (2013). Acknowledgement of this pervasive gridlock is
both popular and scholarly. See, e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Nicholas Fandos, As Gridlock
Deepens in Congress, Only Gloom Is Bipartisan, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2018), https://www.nyt
imes.com/2018/01/27/us/politics/congress-dysfunction-conspiracies-trump.html [https://per
ma.cc/F8F9-K25X]; Jeff Jacoby, Three Cheers for Congressional Gridlock, BOS. GLOBE (Nov.
14, 2018, 12:27 PM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2018/11/14 /three-cheers-for-con
gressional-gridlock/aNUy80tVALaN0tELFuDmmL/story.html [https://perma.cc/W5UA-WA
UX]; Christopher Ingraham, Congressional Gridlock Has Doubled Since the 1950s, WASH.
POST (May 28, 2014, 1:01 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2014/05/28
/congressional-gridlock-has-doubled-since-the-1950s/ [https://perma.cc/2UAN-EMQW].
15. See infra Parts I, V (detailing the constitutional and statutory challenges to the
ACA and implementation resistance among governors and state legislatures). On the reduction in uninsured individuals, compare SARA R. COLLINS, HERMAN K. BHUPAL & MICHELLE
M. DOTY, HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE EIGHT YEARS AFTER THE ACA tbls. 1 & 3 (Feb. 7,
2019), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/sites/default/files/2019-02/Collins_hlt_ins_cove
rage_8_years_after_ACA_2018_biennial_survey_tables.pdf [https://perma.cc/F27M-C55D]
(reporting 24 million uninsured Americans in 2018), with Letter from Douglas W. Elmendorf, Dir., Cong. Budget Office, to Nancy Pelosi, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives
(Mar. 20, 2010) [hereinafter Pelosi Letter], https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/111th-con
gress-2009-2010/costestimate/amendreconprop.pdf [https://perma.cc/7HYJ-PRN8] (projecting that, in the absence the ACA, there would be 54 million uninsured by 2019).
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has admirable structural elements that have allowed it to expand
its reach over time.16
Moreover, the ACA has achieved these goals in an interesting
way. Rather than implementing a single federalist policy, it simultaneously introduced two separate federalist structures into the
modern political landscape. These two structures have had surprisingly different levels of success in achieving their stated goals. The
ACA experience therefore illuminates contrasts in the implementation of two different federalism structures, further enhancing the
ACA’s appeal as a particularly useful study of contemporary federalism in action.
We argue that the ACA offers three critical lessons about how to
structure modern, federalist social justice legislation that both respects states as partners and builds effectively toward national
norms.17 The first regards the uses and limits of federal funding.
Much of the ACA’s structure, particularly as reinterpreted by the
courts,18 relies upon voluntary uptake by the states. The Act motivates state uptake through a familiar statutory structure: offer the
“carrot” of greater control or federal funding to the states, and economic rationality will induce their participation.19 In the case of
the ACA, however, states have been perfectly willing to reject eco-

16. For caveats to the ACA’s success, see infra section II.A (discussing the Supreme
Court’s opinion in National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) v. Sebelius rendering the state Medicaid expansion optional, and the varying state decisions to expand); infra
notes 106–09 and accompanying text (discussing individuals declining to purchase insurance on the Exchanges); infra note 167 and accompanying text (discussing repeal of the
individual mandate).
17. We focus in particular on the Act’s approach to questions of “intrastatutory” federalism—that is to say, its structural choices regarding how to allocate power and authority
between the states and the federal government. On the concept of “intrastatutory federalism,” see Gluck, supra note 12.
18. As we explain infra, the Supreme Court’s opinion in NFIB transformed the Medicaid expansion component of the ACA from a mandatory requirement on the states to expand or else lose all funding, into a choice states could make to accept or reject federal funding contingent on Medicaid expansion. See infra section II.A; see also NFIB v. Sebelius, 567
U.S. 519, 581–85 (2012).
19. For programs employing this structure, see, for example, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (Medicaid, Title XIX of the Social Security Act and Children’s Health Insurance Program, Title
XXI of the Social Security Act); 42 U.S.C. § 7509 (Clean Air Act provision conditioning highway funding on state compliance); 49 U.S.C. § 31103 (National Transportation Assistance
Act); and 20 U.S.C. § 6316(a)(1) (No Child Left Behind Act).
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nomically rational decisions in order to maintain ideological purity20—a reality that has undermined many of the structural assumptions of the Act. Moreover, this economic irrationality has
been mirrored at the individual level, with nearly 5.8 million individuals electing not to purchase insurance even when doing so
would have been cheaper than paying the ACA tax penalty.21 For
architects of new legislative efforts, the key takeaway is that economic incentives, whether in the form of generous federal funding
offers or noncompliance penalties, cannot necessarily trump hyperpartisanship. Consequently, more aggressive backstop policies,
i.e., policies that apply in the absence of voluntary state or individual participation, are a vital component of modern statutory structure.22
Second, we argue that the ACA’s durability in the face of initial
resistance owes much to the statute’s creation of unusual coalitions
that helped, in certain instances, to break down the hyperpartisanship that marks our modern politics. In Madisonian fashion, the
statute pitted ambition against ambition by structuring programs
in ways that leveraged the support of newly insured individuals,
critical portions of the business community, and certain agency
personnel and governors in red states.23 Although no panacea,
studies have shown that these cross-partisan alliances proved useful in prodding at least certain Republican-controlled states to expand Medicaid under the ACA.24 As such, the ACA underscores the
need to focus not only upon rules, but also upon allies and coalitions. It teaches a lesson underappreciated in the design of federal
statutes: the necessity of designing reforms to create the political
conditions necessary for their continued success through fracturing old coalitions, creating new coalitions, and empowering sympathetic actors inside and outside government.25

20. See infra section II.A.
21. Matthew Rae, Larry Levitt & Ashley Semanskee, How Many of the Uninsured Can
Purchase a Marketplace Plan for Less than Their Shared Responsibility Penalty?, KAISER
FAM. FOUND. (Nov. 2017), http://files.kff.org/attachment/Issue-Brief-How-Many-of-the-Un
insured-can-Purchase-a-Marketplace-Plan-for-Less-Than-Their-Shared-Responsibility-Pen
alty [https://perma.cc/5AFU-5G6B].
22. See infra Part III.
23. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison). For the application of this Madisonian
concept to the ACA, see infra Part IV.
24. See infra Part III.
25. See infra Part III.
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Finally, the ACA has valuable information to offer about the
utility of leveraging what we call “statutory entrenchment”—by
which we mean the value of building new programs on the shoulders of old programs that have become politically, administratively, and legally entrenched components of the U.S. regulatory
state.26 Contrary to assumptions about the stability and continuity
of law, experience with the ACA suggests that building on entrenched programs may have surprisingly muted legal benefits but
significant political benefits under modern hyperpartisan conditions. These political gains are best evidenced by the portion of the
ACA that built upon Medicaid. The Medicaid expansion component
of the Act has been the most widely adopted over time, including
in Republican-controlled states, typically after a period of popular
pressure within the state.27 Thus, entrenchment offers a methodology for enhancing the norm-building that new federalism scholars appropriately argue is central to nationwide achievement of social justice goals.
These three lessons from the ACA—about the newly important
need to backstop federal funding, the utility of party-fracturing coalitions, and the counterintuitive contemporary benefits of entrenchment—all point to a need to reexamine classic models of cooperative federalism in our hyperpartisan era. By developing these
three takeaways, our analysis focuses on lessons the ACA offers
regarding how to make social justice legislation succeed and endure
within the federalist structures that now dominate the modern administrative state. In drawing these lessons, we have benefitted
from a wealth of literature that scrutinizes the lessons that the
ACA offers to modern federalism scholarship.28 However, our lens
26. See infra section IV.A.
27. See infra Part III.
28. See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck & Thomas Scott-Railton, Affordable Care Act Entrenchment,
108 GEO. L.J. 495 (2020); Gluck & Huberfeld, supra note 3 (reporting key findings on the
ACA’s relationship to commonly touted federalism values); Gluck, supra note 12; Abbe R.
Gluck, Federalism from Federal Statutes: Health Reform, Medicaid, and the Old-Fashioned
Federalists’ Gamble, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1749 (2013) [hereinafter Gluck, Federalism from
Federal Statutes]; Abbe R. Gluck, Our [National] Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1996 (2014);
Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Executive Federalism Comes to America, 102 VA. L. REV. 953 (2016);
Gillian E. Metzger, Agencies, Polarization, and the States, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1739 (2015)
[hereinafter Metzger, Agencies]; Samuel R. Bagenstos, Federalism by Waiver After the
Health Care Case, in THE HEALTH CARE CASE: THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION AND ITS
IMPLICATIONS 227 (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 2013); Frank J. Thompson & Michael K.
Gusmano, The Administrative Presidency and Fractious Federalism: The Case of Obamacare, PUBLIUS, Summer 2014, at 426, 426; Gillian E. Metzger, To Tax, to Spend, to Regulate,
126 HARV. L. REV. 83 (2012) [hereinafter Metzger, To Tax]; Gerken, supra note 12, at 944
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is a different one: we are interested not in how the ACA illuminates
debates about the theories and values of federalism, but in how the
ACA’s federalist structure has related over time to achievement of
its substantive goal of expanding access to health care.29
Although the ACA’s implementation trajectory is unique, we
contend that it offers trans-substantive lessons regarding statutory structure to both scholars and policymakers alike. To support
this contention, the final section of the Article applies its lessons
to a leading new national social justice project: the Green New Deal
(“GND”).30 The GND aims to address two of the most significant
challenges facing the United States today: climate change and inequality. To jointly tackle these problems, the GND and similar
emerging legislative efforts call for federal legislation that puts
Americans to work in well-paying jobs that will build the clean energy infrastructure needed to rapidly decarbonize the U.S. economy.31 However, the precise contours of the GND, including answers to questions about how to design such an ambitious program
within the thicket of entrenched cooperative federalist structures
that pervade U.S. energy and environmental law,32 are yet to be
worked out.
We show how the lessons offered by the ACA might aid drafters
of a GND-like program in design choices regarding how to build
upon existing state or federal efforts, how to best incentivize state

(arguing that the ACA offers critical lessons about “the power of the servant” in cooperative
federalist arrangements).
29. Cf. Bulman-Pozen, supra note 2, at 1081 (acknowledging that more work needs to
be done on the substantive implications of uncooperative federalism).
30. Most notably, Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Senator Ed Markey introduced a (non-binding) Green New Deal Resolution in the House and Senate in February
2019. See H.R. Res. 109, 116th Cong. (1st Sess. 2019).
31. See id.
32. See infra section II.B; see also ERIN RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TUG OF WAR
WITHIN 304 (2011) (describing the “interjurisdictional zone” that dominates contemporary
environmental law); John P. Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54
MD. L. REV. 1183, 1185 (1995); Jonathan H. Adler & Nathaniel Stewart, Is the Clean Air
Act Unconstitutional? Coercion, Cooperative Federalism and Conditional Spending After
NFIB v. Sebelius, 43 ECOLOGY L.Q. 671, 673 (2016); New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144, 167, 173–74 (1992) (approving of cooperative federalism arrangements wherein Congress “offer[s] States the choice of regulating [an] activity according to federal standards or
having state law pre-empted by federal regulation”); Texas v. EPA, 726 F.3d 180, 196 (D.C.
Cir. 2013) (explaining that the Supreme Court has “repeatedly affirm[ed] the constitutionality of federal statutes that allow States to administer federal programs but provide for
direct federal administration if a State chooses not to administer it”).
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participation, and how to enhance the power of supportive constituencies over time. This applied analysis fleshes out our contention
that acceptance of the virtues or political necessity of federalism
need not foreclose critical inquiries into how best to make modern
federalism work.
We make this argument in five Parts. Part I begins with an overview of the ACA and its federalist structures. Parts II through IV
examine the three lessons the ACA offers for maximizing the success of federalist structures, with each Part devoted to the study of
a different lesson. Part V applies these lessons to the GND. A brief
conclusion follows.
I. SETTING THE STAGE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ACA
The ACA is a dizzyingly complex piece of legislation, covering
906 pages.33 What’s more, the Act’s original structure has been altered substantially by intervening court decisions, making its
structure in practice quite different from its original structure on
the page. In this Part, we offer a synopsis of the structure of the
ACA as it has taken shape through implementation. We also explain why, politically, Congress settled upon this particular federalist structure for expanding health care access.
The overarching goal of the ACA is to expand access to health
care for Americans, and to accomplish this by increasing the number of individuals with health insurance coverage.34 In pursuit of
this goal, the Obama administration largely left questions of policy
design to Congress, a direct response to the prior experience of the

33. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.). The reconciliation
bill enacted as a companion to it was an additional 55 pages. See Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029.
34. Health policies typically are described as pursuing one of three goals: access, quality, or cost reduction. On the Affordable Care Act’s prioritization of access, see, for example,
Gluck & Huberfeld, supra note 3, at 1726 (“The ACA responded to . . . gaps in coverage with
an overarching philosophy one of us has called ‘universality’—universal access to healthcare
through universal access to insurance coverage. . . .”); President Barack Obama, Remarks
by the President on the Affordable Care Act (Oct. 20, 2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/10/20/remarks-president-affordable-care-act [https://perma
.cc/SMK8-JXL5] (“[W]e gave states funding to expand Medicaid to cover more people.”); King
v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 478 (2015) (describing the ACA as “designed to expand coverage”).
Despite its structural focus on increased access, the Act of course also included provisions
aimed at the goals of quality improvement and cost reduction. See Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act §§ 3001–3602, 124 Stat. at 122–24.
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Clinton administration, where failure to accomplish health reform
was widely blamed on the administration’s efforts to dictate policy
design to Congress.35 In response, Congress enacted a law that contained two complementary policies, each of which applies to a specific population. Under the first policy, the Act expanded the Medicaid program, a federal–state hybrid program that, since its
original enactment in 1965, has provided health insurance to certain specified low-income individuals.36 Under the second policy,
the Act created health insurance marketplaces in each state,
known as “Exchanges,” designed to expand access to private health
insurance plans for individuals who would exceed the income
threshold for Medicaid participation.37 Today, each of these reforms provides a distinct (and useful) model of federalism in action,
even though each model was perhaps the product of accident rather than design.
A. Medicaid Expansion
The ACA’s first major reform was to expand the existing Medicaid program. Since its inception, the Medicaid program has offered each state the option to create and administer a health insurance program that the federal government partly subsidizes, if the
program meets certain federal standards.38 One such federal
standard relates to the population that is provided with insurance
under the program. Prior to the ACA, each Medicaid insurance
plan was required to provide coverage only to certain qualified
groups (e.g., children, pregnant women) whose annual income fell
below a specified threshold.39 With respect to these populations,

35. See Jacob S. Hacker, The Road to Somewhere: Why Health Reform Happened, 8
PERSP. ON POL. 861, 865–66 (2010).
36. See Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
37. On the interaction of each policy’s income thresholds, see infra notes 47 and 66 and
accompanying text.
38. The Medicaid program also operates in the District of Columbia and the territories.
Note that Medicaid operates differently in the territories than in the states; this Part’s description of the Medicaid program is specific to the states. For application in the territories,
see Cornelia Hall, Robin Rudowitz & Kathleen Gifford, Medicaid in the Territories: Program
Features, Challenges, and Changes, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Jan. 25, 2019), https://www.kff.
org/report-section/medicaid-in-the-territories-program-features-challenges-and-changes-is
sue-brief/ [https://perma.cc/9RVX-SV4W].
39. Social Security Amendments of 1965 § 1902(a)(10)(A)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (Supp.
2006).
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states were required to design insurance programs that, at a minimum, provided coverage for a core set of health insurance benefits.40 If a state created an insurance program that met these (and
other) requirements, then the federal government would subsidize
a percentage, ranging from fifty percent to eighty-three percent, of
the cost of coverage under the insurance plan.41 Today, every state
participates in the Medicaid program, with the last holdout state
(Arizona) beginning participation in 1982.42
Under this traditional Medicaid program, states retain significant flexibility in the design of their insurance plans. For example,
they can choose to provide coverage for additional populations and
benefits that are listed as optional under the statute,43 and receive
federal funds to partly subsidize these optional costs.44 Moreover,
states can pursue a variety of methods for furnishing insurance
under the program, including state-run, fee-for-service models and
privately run managed-care models.45 And states remain the frontline administrative implementers of the insurance program, a role
that gives them significant control over the disbursement of funds
and the practical implementation of the program.46
Under the ACA, as drafted at least, states participating in Medicaid were required to make their Medicaid plans available to a
new population: individuals with income under 133 percent of the

40. See, e.g., id. § 1902(a)(10), 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (Supp. 2006); id. § 1905(a), 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396d (Supp. 2006).
41. Id. § 1903, 42 U.S.C. § 1396b (providing payment with respect to approved state
plans); id. § 1905(b), 42 U.S.C. § 1396d (specifying federal payment rate).
42. Mary K. Reinhart, Medicaid in Arizona: A Timeline, AZCENTRAL.COM (June 10,
2013, 4:17 PM), http://archive.azcentral.com/news/politics/articles/20130610medicaid-expa
nsion-timeline.html [https://perma.cc/V3ZN-BK7M]. Every other state participated by 1972.
See id.
43. For optional populations, see § 1902(a)(10)(A)(ii), 42 U.S.C. § 1396a. For optional
services, see, for example, id. § 1902(a)(47), 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(47) (ambulatory prenatal
care).
44. See id. § 1903, 42 U.S.C. § 1396b (providing percentage of expenditures to be paid
by federal government for items and services).
45. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICAID MANAGED CARE
ENROLLMENT AND PROGRAM CHARACTERISTICS, 2017 (Winter 2019), https://www.medicaid.
gov/medicaid/managed-care/downloads/enrollment/2017-medicaid-managed-care-enrollme
nt-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/BDP6-SYAX].
46. See, e.g., § 1906, 42 U.S.C. § 1396e (contemplating state use of group health plans
to provide coverage).
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federal poverty line, a group often described colloquially as the “expansion population.”47 In a break with the original Medicaid program, this coverage of low-income individuals was required regardless of whether the individuals belonged to a specified population
group.48 The Act thereby sought to transform the Medicaid program into a comprehensive insurer of a particular socioeconomic
cross-section of the population.
The Medicaid expansion in the ACA was thus drafted to enact a
specific federalist vision. Under that vision, the federal government would present states with an all-or-nothing choice: either expand their Medicaid programs to cover this broader set of individuals, or else opt out of the Medicaid program entirely. If states
chose the latter option, they would cease to receive any corresponding federal Medicaid subsidies and support. For states that elected
to expand (which it was assumed all states would do), the previously established federalist structure of the Medicaid program
would continue without interruption, including with respect to the
new expansion population. States would continue to administer
the program, for example, and to make coverage decisions regarding optional services. Moreover, the federal government would subsidize coverage of the new expansion population particularly heavily, covering 100 percent of its costs for an initial three-year period,
a percentage that subsequently phased down to ninety percent by
2020.49 (By contrast, the Medicaid program’s default subsidization
percentage does not, in practice, exceed seventy-seven percent.50)
In theory, therefore, the ACA’s Medicaid expansion leveraged
the familiar federalist structure of the long-running Medicaid program. However, the Supreme Court redesigned the Medicaid expansion before it fully occurred, holding in the 2012 case of NFIB
v. Sebelius that the expansion, as drafted, was unconstitutionally

47. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2001, 124
Stat. 119, 271 (2010) (adding § 1902(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII) to the Social Security Act).
48. Id.
49. § 1905(y), 42 U.S.C. 1396d. The American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 also increases
this percentage by an additional five percent for a two-year period for states that expand
subsequent to its enactment. See Pub. L. No. 117-2, § 9814, 135 Stat. 4, __ (2021).
50. § 1905(b), 42 U.S.C. § 1396d. In practice, the highest FMAP for fiscal year 2020 is
approximately seventy-seven percent. See Federal Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP)
for Medicaid and Multiplier, KAISER FAM. FOUND. [hereinafter FMAP for Medicaid], https:
//www.kff.org/medicaid/state-indicator/federal-matching-rate-and-multiplier/?currentTime
frame [https://perma.cc/469N-M2GC].
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coercive of the states.51 Rather than simply striking down the expansion, however, the Court chose to remedy this constitutional
defect by deeming coverage of the expansion population to be optional, not mandatory, for the states.52 This is how the Medicaid
expansion has been implemented ever since.
The Court’s opinion in NFIB thereby transformed the Medicaid
expansion into an experimental federalism arrangement unforeseen by the drafters of the ACA. Under this arrangement, the federal government uses its fiscal leverage to present states with an
option to expand their Medicaid programs at a heavily subsidized
rate, but it cannot induce them to do so by otherwise placing all
Medicaid funding in jeopardy. For states that decide to expand, the
federal government dictates certain minimum criteria that must
be built into the design of the state’s insurance plan. Beyond these
basic criteria, states retain significant flexibility to decide how to
structure and administer their subsidized insurance plans. As of
March 2021, thirty-eight states and the District of Columbia have
adopted the Medicaid expansion, while twelve states have not.53
In addition to changing the legal structure of the Medicaid expansion, NFIB has resulted in further state flexibility under the
program. Section 1115 of the Social Security Act gives the Secretary of Health and Human Services broad authority to waive several key statutory Medicaid requirements on the states if, “in the
judgment of the Secretary, [such waiver] is likely to assist in promoting the objectives of [the Medicaid program].”54 After NFIB,
this waiver option became the focal point of negotiations between
states and the Obama administration, with the administration acceding to creative and novel waivers of statutory requirements for
the expansion population in exchange for states agreeing to participate in the Medicaid expansion.55 The Trump administration continued this aggressive use of Medicaid waivers, extending prior
waiver concepts to apply even with respect to non-expansion pop-

51. 567 U.S. 519, 574–85 (2012).
52. Id. at 585–86.
53. Status of State Medicaid Expansion Decisions: Interactive Map, KAISER FAM.
FOUND. (Mar. 12, 2021) [hereinafter Medicaid Expansion Decisions], https://www.kff.org/me
dicaid/issue-brief/status-of-state-medicaid-expansion-decisions-interactive-map/ [https://pe
rma.cc/HB5M-ZZYT].
54. § 1115(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a).
55. On these negotiations, see Gluck & Huberfeld, supra note 3.
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ulations, and granting waivers for elements that stretched the legal limits of the Section 1115 waiver authority (such as work requirements, which have been challenged in the courts).56 As of February 2021, sixty-one waivers had been approved across forty-five
states, and twenty-eight additional waivers were pending across
twenty-four states.57 Four waivers in four states, meanwhile, had
been set aside by courts.58 While the Biden administration now appears to be reversing key Trump administration waiver policies
(such as by beginning to withdraw waivers for work requirements),
it nonetheless seems fair to say that the optional Medicaid expansion created by NFIB has paired with a broad, preexisting waiver
authority to create federal–state negotiations that have introduced
new changes into the decades-old Medicaid program—sometimes
to the detriment of covered populations.
B. Health Benefit Exchanges
The ACA includes a second policy that is designed to expand
health insurance coverage in the United States, which might be
labeled the “Exchange-based policy.” This policy is meant to ensure
coverage for the segment of society that, due to annual income, is
ineligible for Medicaid insurance (even under the pre-NFIB vision
of Medicaid expansion). In this way, the two policies in the Act
were designed to work together toward a goal approaching universal coverage: the Medicaid expansion would ensure insurance coverage for most individuals whose income fell below a threshold
level, while the Exchange-based policy would ensure coverage for

56. See infra Part V; see also Nicholas Bagley, Are Medicaid Work Requirements Legal?,
319 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 763 (2018). No states are currently implementing these work requirements, and as of the date of this Article’s writing, the Biden administration has begun the
process of withdrawing these waivers.
57. Medicaid Waiver Tracker: Approved and Pending Section 1115 Waivers by State,
KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Feb. 25, 2021) [hereinafter Medicaid Waiver Tracker], https://www.
kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/medicaid-waiver-tracker-approved-and-pending-section-1115waivers-by-state/ [https://perma.cc/P6TG-PV8B].
58. Work requirement waivers and waivers relating to eligibility and enrollment have
been set aside in Michigan, Young v. Azar, No. 1:19-cv-03526 (D.D.C. 2020); Arkansas,
Gresham v. Azar, 363 F. Supp. 3d 165 (D.D.C. 2019); Kentucky, Stewart v. Azar, 366 F.
Supp. 3d 125 (D.D.C. 2019); and New Hampshire, Philbrick v. Azar, 397 F. Supp. 3d 11
(D.D.C. 2019). Waiver relating to benefit, copay, and healthy behavior provisions also has
been set aside in Kentucky. Stewart, 366 F. Supp. 3d 125; see also Medicaid Waiver Tracker,
supra note 57.
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most individuals whose income exceeded that threshold.59 This Exchange-based policy consisted of three interlocking reforms:60
•

Guaranteed Issue & Community Rating Requirements,
which required that, when a private insurer sells health insurance, the insurer must make that insurance available to
all individuals who want to purchase it (and, for the most
part, at the same price).61

•

The Individual Mandate, which required individuals to either maintain health insurance, or else make a payment to
the IRS.62 This would incentivize healthy individuals (who
typically are profitable for insurers) to enter the health care
market, thereby offsetting the costs of the guaranteed issue
and community rating requirements (which would obligate
insurers to cover unprofitable individuals). This policy was
subsequently repealed by the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of
2017,63 but insurance markets have remained stable in its
absence.64

•

Low-Income Tax Credits, which provided individuals whose
incomes did not exceed 400 percent of the federal poverty
line with tax credits that could be used to purchase health
insurance.65

59. Even under this scheme (which would not be fully realized), coverage would not be
universal. The Congressional Budget Office estimated at the time of enactment that the Act
still would leave roughly “23 million nonelderly residents uninsured (about one-third of
whom would be unauthorized immigrants).” Pelosi Letter, supra note 15.
60. As the Court put it in King v. Burwell: “The Affordable Care Act adopts a version of
the three key reforms that made the Massachusetts system successful . . . . These three reforms are closely intertwined.” 576 U.S. 473, 481–82 (2015).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg.
62. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A.
63. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11081, 131 Stat. 2054,
2092 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A) (repealing individual mandate).
64. See Peter Sullivan, Analysis: ObamaCare Market Stable and Profitable Despite Loss
of Individual Mandate, HILL (Jan. 6, 2020, 10:47 AM), https://thehill.com/policy/healthcare
/476916-analysis-obamacare-market-stable-and-profitable-despite-loss-of-individual [https:
//perma.cc/6YHY-BMF9].
65. 26 U.S.C. § 36B. The American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 also extends premium tax
credits for 2021 and 2022 to reach those with incomes above the 400 percent threshold. See
Pub. L. No. 117-2, § 9661, 135 Stat. 4, __ (2021); see also id. § 9662 (preventing clawback of
excessive 2020 premium tax credits).
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Under the Act, these three interlocking reforms would be implemented largely through “American Health Benefit Exchanges.”66
Each of these Exchanges would operate as a central marketplace
for purchasing private insurance—a shopping mall, in effect,
where customers could compare and purchase private insurance
plans. The Democratic Party had coalesced around this Exchange
model during the 2008 presidential campaign. All three major
Democratic candidates supported some iteration of it because of its
proven ability (in Massachusetts) to garner buy-in from key interest groups while generating meaningful expansion of insurance
coverage.67 Although those 2008 candidates also had all supported
the inclusion of a governmentally run insurance option on the Exchanges (i.e., a “public option”), Joe Lieberman’s opposition to that
idea led to its removal (as Lieberman’s vote was needed to end a
Senate filibuster).68 As a result, the Exchanges would operate
simply as a market for the purchasing of private insurance plans.
Despite lacking a public option, it was believed the Exchanges
would provide a useful vehicle for realizing the Act’s reforms. The
low-income tax credits would apply only to plans purchased
through an Exchange, for example. As a condition of selling insurance on the Exchanges, insurers would be required to comply with
various access-enhancing rules, such as the guaranteed issue and
community rating requirements.69 As a result, the Exchanges
would become the locus of a new private insurance marketplace,
legally structured to provide individuals with access to quality, affordable health insurance plans.70
Each state could elect to design and maintain its own Exchange,
an action that would allow the state to assume several noteworthy
responsibilities.71 For example, the state would gain administra-

66. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1311(b), 42 U.S.C. 18031(b).
67. See Hacker, supra note 35, at 866.
68. See id. at 862, 866.
69. A separate, largely redundant set of legal provisions also would apply these requirements to off-Exchange plans. See Public Health Service Act §§ 2701–2708 (as added by Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1201); Public Health Service Act §§ 2711–2719
(as added by Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1001).
70. This section focuses on describing the Exchanges created to sell insurance on the
individual market. The Act also provided for the creation of “SHOP Exchange[s]” where
small businesses could purchase group health plans to cover employees. See § 1311(b)(1)(B),
42 U.S.C. § 18031(b)(1)(B).
71. Id. § 1311(b), 42 U.S.C. § 18031(b).
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tive control over eligibility determinations and enrollment outreach efforts.72 It also would obtain control over determinations of
insurance plan compliance with many of the ACA’s insurer requirements, such as those relating to plan rates and benefits, insurer marketing, and insurer performance on quality metrics.73 By
contrast, if a state declined to maintain its own Exchange, then the
federal government would maintain an Exchange within the
state.74
Just as the federalism scheme of the Medicaid expansion was
the accidental result of NFIB v. Sebelius, the scheme of the Exchanges may have been the accidental result of congressional politics. When Congress was debating health care proposals, a bill was
passed by the House of Representatives that would have created a
national insurance Exchange (rather than a series of state-based
Exchanges).75 The death of Ted Kennedy in August of 2009, however, led Senate Democrats to lose their filibuster-proof majority—
and, as a result, congressional Democrats then focused on the only
iteration of health care reform that had passed the Senate prior to
Kennedy’s death.76 That bill, which was the hastily merged product
of two drafts (produced by the Senate HELP Committee and the
Senate Finance Committee, respectively), consequently would become the enacted law.77 The result is the federalism scheme that
exists under current law—one that lets states opt into administering their own Exchanges, with backstop federal authority to run
Exchanges in states that elect not to design and maintain their
own Exchanges.
In practice, however, the Exchanges have not operated in this
cleanly bifurcated, state-or-federal manner. As political backlash
to the Act emerged in the wake of its enactment, a number of states
signaled their intent not to create state-based Exchanges. In the

72. Sarah Goodell, Federally Facilitated Exchanges, HEALTHAFFAIRS (Jan. 31, 2013),
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hpb20130131.766527/full/ [https://perma.cc/H7X
R-5LSH].
73. Id.
74. § 1321(c), 42 U.S.C. § 18041(c).
75. H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. (2009). It also would have included a federally created public
option.
76. See Abbe R. Gluck, Imperfect Statutes, Imperfect Courts: Understanding Congress’s
Plan in the Era of Unorthodox Lawmaking, 129 HARV. L. REV. 62, 78 (2015).
77. Id. at 76–77.
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effort to encourage state participation, therefore, the Obama administration treated the Act’s bifurcated Exchange option not as a
legally required choice, but instead as the starting point for negotiations with the states. In many instances, these negotiations resulted in hybrid Exchanges—i.e., Exchanges that split control between federal and state governments. Under these hybrid
Exchanges, the federal government assumes certain functions—
functions that might include maintenance of the Exchange’s digital
platform, setting of geographic rate areas, or conducting rate reviews—while the state otherwise maintains administrative authority.78
The Trump administration continued this practice of allowing
hybrid Exchanges. As a result, the Exchanges that existed for 2021
could be roughly categorized as fifteen state-based Exchanges (including Washington, D.C.), six state-based Exchanges that make
use of a federal platform, six Exchanges that are more extensively
split between federal and state governments, and twenty-four federally facilitated Exchanges.79 Within these broad categories, there
remains tremendous diversity and nuance in the divisions of labor
between federal and state government in the Exchanges.80
The ACA therefore presents a critical case study of how two different federalism models have unfolded, side-by-side, in a modern
hyperpartisan political climate. As such, we believe it can offer
unique federalism lessons for other federal legislative projects—
lessons we turn to in the sections that follow.
II. THE USES (AND LIMITS) OF FEDERAL FUNDS AND INCENTIVES
Particularly since the New Deal, federal programs routinely
have relied on the power of economic incentives to induce desired
activity by state and private actors.81 In relying upon incentives,

78. See Gluck & Huberfeld, supra note 3, at 1763–64.
79. Louise Norris, Health Insurance Marketplaces by State, HEALTHINSURANCE.ORG
(Oct. 7, 2020), https://www.healthinsurance.org/state-health-insurance-exchanges/ [https://
perma.cc/FF5V-GKE9]; see also State Health Insurance Marketplace Types, 2021, KAISER
FAM. FOUND., https://www.kff.org/health-reform/state-indicator/state-health-insurance-ma
rketplace-types/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%2
2sort%22:%22asc%22%7D [https://perma.cc/W5CN-G8U5].
80. See Gluck & Huberfeld, supra note 3, at 1763–64.
81. See, e.g., Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-10, 48 Stat. 31 (offering farmers fiscal incentives to cut production), invalidated by United States v. Butler, 297
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program designers have assumed that these are economically rational actors, who will undertake federally desired projects so long
as it makes financial sense to do so.82 In prior decades, this economic-rationality assumption has proven accurate. There have
been notable exceptions, of course—with poorer southern states
sometimes proving less responsive to federal welfare program enticements than their wealthier northern counterparts, for example.83 Yet a variety of studies examining state action have concluded that, by and large, state governments are indeed rationally
responsive to economic inducements.84 And a host of landmark federal statutes have successfully leveraged economic incentives to
achieve desired reforms.85 This story changed, however, with the
ACA.

U.S. 1 (1936) (effectively restored by the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 following invalidation by Butler); Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1407(a)(1)
(2006); Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2006); Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410,
7420 (2006).
82. See, e.g., Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism:
Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813,
819 (1998) (“The federal government can purchase the services of state and local governments whenever it is cost-effective to do so; it has no more need to conscript such services
than it has to conscript the services of secretaries, FBI agents, janitors, or Supreme Court
Justices.”). We focus here on the uses and limits of federal funds after enactment. As such,
we do not discuss federal funding’s pre-enactment benefits—most notably, its ability to let
Congress pursue reforms via the filibuster-proof method of reconciliation bills. We note,
however, that reconciliation bills (and other fast-track procedures) increasingly are how
Congress gets its lawmaking done. See, e.g., Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 11597, 131 Stat. 2054 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 1) (Trump tax bill that was reconciliation bill); Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124
Stat. 1029 (reconciliation bill enacted as companion to ACA).
83. See Gluck & Huberfeld, supra note 3, at 1710. Race dynamics also clearly complicate
state decisions around health care. See, e.g., id.; DAVID G. SMITH & JUDITH D. MOORE,
MEDICAID POLITICS AND POLICY, 1965–2007, at 6–10 (2008) (detailing role of race in Medicaid decisionmaking). Several scholars have suggested that racism has played a role in distorting decisionmaking under the ACA as well. See, e.g., Colleen M. Grogan & Sunggeun
Park, The Racial Divide in State Medicaid Expansions, 42 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 539
(2017) (presenting findings that state Medicaid expansion decisions have been significantly
less responsive to nonwhite public opinion); Mark A. Hall, States’ Decisions Not to Expand
Medicaid, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1459 (2014) (arguing that racism may drive state Medicaid expansion decisions).
84. Ae-sook Kim & Edward Jennings, The Evolution of an Innovation: Variations in
Medicaid Managed Care Program Extensiveness, 37 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 815 (2012);
Robert S. Erikson, Gerald C. Wright, Jr. & John P. McIver, Political Parties, Public Opinion,
and State Policy in the United States, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 729 (1989).
85. For examples of such programs, see supra note 19.
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A. Motivating States
The story of Medicaid expansion offers a particularly salient lesson about the present-day limits of economic incentives. In practice, this expansion presented states with a choice either to adopt
the Medicaid expansion or to retain their pre-ACA Medicaid program. The question, therefore, was whether the economic incentive
of further federal subsidization would induce states to expand their
Medicaid programs. (Recall that this ultimate state choice was different from that intended by the architects of the ACA, who meant
to give states the draconian choice between adopting the Medicaid
expansion and abandoning their Medicaid programs entirely—a
structure the Supreme Court rejected in NFIB.86)
Even as modified by the Court in NFIB, the financial incentives
for states to adopt the expansion were overwhelming. As Part I explained, the federal government covered 100 percent of a state’s
expansion-related costs for an initial three-year period—and, in future years, it would never cover less than ninety percent of costs.87
These rates far exceeded the federal contribution rates under the
traditional Medicaid program, which range in practice from fifty
percent to seventy-seven percent.88 Moreover, the costs that states
would bear regarding expansion would be partly offset by the reduction of uncompensated care within the state, the cost of which
typically falls heavily on the state (or its health care system).89

86. See supra notes 51–53 and accompanying text.
87. Social Security Amendments of 1965 § 1905(y), 42. U.S.C. 1396d (establishing statutory maximum and minimum); see also supra note 48 (on temporary increase for new adoption under the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021).
88. See id. § 1905(b), 42 U.S.C. § 1396b; FMAP for Medicaid, supra note 50 (detailing
state payment levels in practice).
89. On the distribution of the burden of uncompensated care costs, see Teresa A. Coughlin, John Holahan, Kyle Caswell & Megan McGrath, An Estimated $84.9 Billion in Uncompensated Care Was Provided in 2013; ACA Payment Cuts Could Challenge Providers, 33
HEALTH AFF. 807 (2014), https://www.healthaffairs.org/doi/pdf/10.1377/hlthaff.2013.1068
[https://perma.cc/BQX4-SFS3]; Dhruv Khullar, Zirui Song & Dave A. Chokshi, Safety-Net
Health Systems at Risk: Who Bears the Burden of Uncompensated Care?, HEALTH AFF. BLOG
(May 10, 2018), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20180503.138516/full/ [http
s://perma.cc/YE83-RHCE]. The ACA simultaneously reduced other means of subsidizing uncompensated care costs, making a non-expansion yet more costly to a state. See Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act § 2551, 42 U.S.C. 1396r–4(f). These reductions have been
delayed, but currently are set to apply for 2020 through 2025. Id. § 1923(f)(7), 42 U.S.C.
1396r–4(f)(7). The costs of uncompensated care in a state can be significant; in Texas, for
example, they amount to roughly $5.5 billion annually. Wade Goodwyn, Texas Loses Billions
to Treat the Poor by Not Expanding Medicaid, Advocates Say, NPR (May 29, 2015, 5:08 AM),
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Despite this powerful financial incentive, many states declined
to expand.90 In the wake of the Act’s passage, factions within the
Republican Party began to argue that state expansion was a form
of complicity with the ACA, and these factions persuaded a number
of state-level party leaders not to pursue expansion.91 By 2016, the
final year in which states could receive 100 percent federal compensation for expansion-related services, nineteen states still had
not decided to expand.92 Today, twelve states still have not undertaken the expansion (see Figure 1).
Figure 1. Status of State Action on the Medicaid Expansion Decision93

It seems, then, that partisan loyalty has trumped economic rationality in many southern and some midwestern and western
states. One might have hypothesized that states with the direst

https://www.npr.org/2015/05/29/410470081/texas-didn-t-expand-medicaid-advocates-say-m
oney-is-being-left-on-the-table?utm_medium=RSS&amp;utm_campaign=healthcare [https
://perma.cc/AEJ8-LUKT].
90. As Nicholas Bagley has put it: “In conventional economic terms, this resistance is
inexplicable. . . .” Nicholas Bagley, Federalism and the End of Obamacare, 127 YALE L.J.F.
1, 7 (2017).
91. See Alexander Hertel-Fernandez, Theda Skocpol & Daniel Lynch, Business Associations, Conservative Networks, and the Ongoing Republican War over Medicaid Expansion,
41 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 239, 240–42 (2016) (describing opposition to Medicaid expansion among conservative organizations and grassroots activists, and tracking these opponents’ impact upon state expansion decisions).
92. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MEDICAID & CHIP: AUGUST 2016 MONTHLY
APPLICATIONS, ELIGIBILITY DETERMINATIONS AND ENROLLMENT REPORT (2016), https://ww
w.medicaid.gov/medicaid/downloads/august-2016-enrollment-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/P
UT9-XV68].
93. Medicaid Expansion Decisions, supra note 53.
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health care needs would be most likely to overcome partisan wrangling. But several studies have concluded that financial factors
(and, in particular, levels of state economic need) have not driven
state decisions on Medicaid expansion.94 Moreover, states that had
particularly lean Medicaid programs prior to the ACA, and which
therefore stood to gain the most via expansion, have proven particularly unlikely to expand.95 The impact of federal financial incentives under the expansion, it seems, has been far more muted than
prior federal experience and pre-ACA research would suggest.
The experience with Exchanges under the ACA reinforces these
lessons about the limited effect of incentives on states (although,
in this case, not with respect to economic incentives). As rational
actors, it was thought, states would prefer to establish their own
Exchanges rather than defer to federal Exchanges, to maximize
their control over the state’s insurance market. This incentive presumably would weigh most heavily upon Republican-controlled
states that traditionally have voiced concern for states’ rights and
local control over policymaking.96 As Republican grassroots campaigns and lobbying organizations pressed party leaders to abstain
from all participation in the Act’s reforms, however (such as by
mailing envelopes of string to Scott Walker to impugn his proposed
attachment to federal funds),97 various Republican-controlled
states elected to defer to federal Exchanges.98 For 2021, there are
fifteen state Exchanges, six federally supported Exchanges, six
state-federal partnership Exchanges, and twenty-four federally facilitated Exchanges (see Figure 2).

94. Lawrence R. Jacobs & Timothy Callaghan, Why States Expand Medicaid: Party,
Resources, and History, 38 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1023, 1035 (2013); Charles Barrilleaux & Carlisle Rainey, The Politics of Need: Examining Governors’ Decisions to Oppose the
“Obamacare” Medicaid Expansion, 14 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 437, 442–43 (2014); Martin
Mayer, Robert Kenter & John C. Morris, Partisan Politics or Public-Health Need?, 34 POL.
& LIFE SCI. 44, 44 (2015).
95. Hall, supra note 83, at 1461–62.
96. As Mark A. Hall remarked on state decisions not to create Exchanges: “[T]he extent
of red-state resistance to the ACA’s core structures is surprising. States that run their own
insurance exchanges have much more local control over the very kind of important policy
and regulatory matters that conservatives vociferously complain the federal government
usurps.” Id. at 1460.
97. David K. Jones, Katharine W.V. Bradley & Jonathan Oberlander, Pascal’s Wager:
Health Insurance Exchanges, Obamacare, and the Republican Dilemma, 39 J. HEALTH POL.
POL’Y & L. 97, 120 (2014).
98. For the relationship between Exchange decisions and party control among the
states, see Hall, supra note 83, at 1460.
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Figure 2. Status of Insurance Exchanges by State99

As with the Medicaid expansion, therefore, the Exchange-based
reforms underscore that, in the current hyperpartisan landscape,
politics may often trump the types of rationality assumed by incentive-driven regulatory approaches.
One reasonable conclusion to draw from the ACA’s experience
with targeted state incentives might be that these are no longer a
wise tool for statutory design. But the ACA experience also offers
a more nuanced lesson. It instructs that when economic incentives
are used, it is vital to buttress them with “backstop” policies—i.e.,
with policies that, in the absence of rational economic behavior,
will apply and achieve statutory goals. When states elected not to
create state-run Exchanges, a backstop policy ensured that Exchanges nonetheless would exist in these states—in this case, in
the form of federally run Exchanges.100 As a result, Exchanges now
exist in all fifty states (see Figure 2, supra).101
By contrast, when states opted not to pursue the Medicaid expansion, there was no fallback policy to provide the expansion population with insurance by other means. (Perversely, many of these
individuals do not even receive as a fallback the subsidies that are

99. Norris, supra note 79.
100. The federal backstop Exchange may even be preferable from the federal government’s point of view, as it maximizes its control. See Gluck, supra note 12, at 594.
101. Moreover, even if the Exchanges collapsed or were repealed, parallel amendments
to the Public Health Service Act would accomplish many of the same goals. See generally
supra note 69.
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provided to low-income individuals on the Exchanges; those subsidies assumed a mandatory Medicaid expansion and, therefore,
were not drafted to apply to individuals below the poverty line.102)
The lack of a backstop policy was due to the fact that, as originally
drafted, the ACA intended to make the decision to forego Medicaid
expansion so draconian that no state was thought likely to object.103 But following the NFIB opinion, which rendered state Medicaid expansion more voluntary, hyperpartisan politics trumped
economic rationality. As a result, vulnerable populations in nonexpansion states—which amount to approximately 4.4 million people nationwide—are simply going uninsured.104 The presence or
absence of a legislative backstop to guard against irrationality
among the states, therefore, has proved a crucial design difference
between the Act’s two reforms—a difference that has allowed the
Exchanges to be more successful than the Medicaid expansion with
respect to the goal of expanded health care access. (Indeed, in a sad
twist of irony, Erin Ryan has suggested that inclusion of a federal
Medicaid backstop might have saved the Medicaid program as
originally drafted, since states would not have faced the “all-ornothing dilemma” that rejecting Medicaid expansion posed in the
original ACA.105)
B. Motivating Individuals
The ACA also exposed limits on the power that financial incentives can exert upon individuals. This was shown, in particular,
with the individual mandate. That mandate imposed a tax upon
individuals who elected not to obtain health insurance, largely to
make it economically rational for all individuals to purchase health
insurance.106 Nevertheless, many people defied economic rationality in their insurance decisions: in 2018, 7.7 million people elected
to pay the tax penalty rather than purchase insurance.107 Among

102. Rachel Garfield, Kendal Orgera & Anthony Damico, The Coverage Gap: Uninsured
Poor Adults in States That Do Not Expand Medicaid, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Jan. 21, 2021),
https://www.kff.org/medicaid/issue-brief/the-coverage-gap-uninsured-poor-adults-in-statesthat-do-not-expand-medicaid/ [https://perma.cc/NUV3-RSXD].
103. See supra notes 47–50 and accompanying text.
104. See Garfield et al., supra note 102.
105. Erin Ryan, The Spending Power and Environmental Law After Sebelius, 85 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1003, 1055 (2014).
106. Rae et al., supra note 21.
107. Id.
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these individuals, a 2017 Kaiser Foundation study found that fiftyfour percent would be better off financially if they instead complied
with the mandate and purchased insurance (even if they never
used the insurance). Among uninsured individuals eligible for subsidies, it found that a startling seventy percent would have been
financially better off purchasing health care.108 These numbers
make plain that individuals, like states, have sometimes undermined the ACA’s incentive structures by adopting economically irrational behavior.109
The ACA may also have made overconfident downstream assumptions about the rational behavior of insurers. In order for an
Exchange to successfully expand health care access, of course, the
Exchange must make insurance plans available. Rather than guaranteeing the availability of plans, however, the ACA simply created incentives and revenue streams designed to make the offering
of insurance a profitable endeavor, even under the Act’s new regulatory constraints. The resulting economic incentives, it was
thought, would induce insurers to offer health insurance plans on
the Exchanges in each geographic market. The strength of that assumption, however, relies on robust individual participation in the
Exchanges, which, as described above, the Act overestimated.
While the downstream assumption about insurer behavior has
never collapsed, it has been put under great stress. At one point, it
appeared that certain geographic areas might not have any plans
available on their Exchanges for 2018.110 This produced needless
anxiety (and politically damaging press coverage) with respect to
the Exchanges.111 This risk could have been avoided if, for example,

108. Id.
109. Advances in behavioral economics have suggested many reasons that suppositions
of economic rationality might not hold. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard
Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); Amos
Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI.
1124 (1974). We do not conjecture here as to the specific reasons that individuals acted irrationally in their responses to the ACA.
110. See Olga Khazan, Why So Many Insurers Are Leaving Obamacare, ATLANTIC (May
11, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2017/05/why-so-many-insurers-areleaving-obamacare/526137/ [https://perma.cc/96RB-KEWK] (describing the period in which
it appeared that a portion of Tennessee would have no Exchange plans available, and reporting that thirty-one percent of counties had only one insurer making Exchange plans
available).
111. Hannah Recht, Thousands of Obamacare Customers Left Without Options as Insurers Bolt, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 27, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2017-health-in
surer-exits/ [https://perma.cc/3Q6C-RB27]; Tami Luhby, Humana Pulls Out of Obamacare
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the drafters of the ACA had followed the model found in Part D of
the Medicare program. Much like the Exchanges, Part D assumes
that health insurers will make plans available in all markets (in
this case, with respect to prescription drug coverage for Medicare
participants). However, it also provides a statutory backstop that
applies if this assumption proves incorrect, as it requires the Secretary of Health and Human Services to contract with a fallback
plan to provide drug benefits in a region with no plans.112 While
this Part D backstop policy has never been put to use, it forestalls
any concerns that the Part D program is vulnerable to market failures.
In sum, then, the ACA stands as a testament, for better and for
worse, of the more limited role that federal funding and other incentives can play today, as compared to past decades. More strategic statutory structures are needed to ensure widespread uptake
in hyperpartisan conditions.
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF COALITIONS
In Federalist 48, Madison famously argued that it was insufficient for lawmakers to focus simply on the construction of a system
of rules and prohibitions (of “parchment barriers,” as he put it), no
matter how well-designed.113 Such a system, without more, had
been revealed by state constitutions to be vulnerable to assault by
powerful interests. In pursuit of a “more adequate defence” against
such interests, Madison and his fellow Founders adopted an approach to system design that also focused on creating and empowering allies and coalitions invested in the system’s preservation
and success.114
for 2018, CNN MONEY (Feb. 14, 2017, 5:08 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2017/02/14/news
/economy/humana-obamacare-insurer/ [https://perma.cc/YY4C-JXB2]; Max Blau, No Plans
in Knoxville: This Tennessee City Will Soon Have No Health Insurers, STAT NEWS (Mar. 1,
2017), https://www.statnews.com/2017/03/01/tennessee-obamacare-trumpcare/ [https://per
ma.cc/GF7Q-CK4E]. For attempts to translate this issue into decreased support for the
ACA, see Khazan, supra note 110 (describing efforts by President Trump and Secretary of
Health and Human Services Tom Price to use low insurer participation rates as evidence
that the Act was collapsing).
112. Social Security Amendments of 1965 § 1860D–11(g), 42 U.S.C. 1395w–111.
113. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 256 (James Madison) (Gideon ed., 2001) (“Will it be
sufficient to mark, with precision, the boundaries of these departments, in the constitution
of the government, and to trust to these parchment barriers against the encroaching spirit
of power?”).
114. Id.; THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 268 (James Madison) (Gideon ed., 2001) (concluding
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This Founding-era lesson was developed in the context of constitutional design, but it applies equally to statutes. Indeed, both
halves of Madison’s lesson have been underscored by the experience of the ACA. On the one hand, the ACA has served as a startling reminder of the vulnerability of “parchment barriers.” A number of rules and prohibitions, despite being written into the law, no
longer have legal effect as a result of court actions,115 congressional
repeals,116 and administrative non-enforcement (or creative, alternative enforcement).117 Especially in a hyper-politicized environment, the ACA has shown, “parchment barriers” can prove remarkably flimsy in the face of assault by ambitious actors. On the other
hand, the ACA offers a more optimistic illustration of Madison’s
lessons about coalitions acting as important checks to such assaults.
The ACA experience illustrates that statutory architects can
remedy some of a law’s vulnerabilities by designing a statute that
creates cross-partisan coalitions invested in the Act’s success. The
value of coalitions, and the ability of statutes to actively create
them, is not a new observation, of course. A significant body of political science research has documented that, in many cases, fed-

that “[a]mbition must be made to counteract ambition” via constitutional separation of powers).
115. See, e.g., NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 585–89 (2012) (finding Medicaid expansion
unconstitutionally coercive of states).
116. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11081, 131 Stat. 2054,
2092 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A) (repealing individual mandate); see also
Peter Sullivan, House Votes to Repeal ObamaCare’s ‘Cadillac Tax,’ HILL (July 17, 2019, 7:00
PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/house/453603-house-votes-to-repeal-obamacares-cadill
ac-tax [https://perma.cc/4LX2-BURK] (on ongoing efforts to repeal the Act’s tax on high-cost
health plans, commonly known as the “Cadillac tax”).
117. See supra notes 78–80 and accompanying text (discussing hybrid Exchanges); see
also infra notes 179–81 and accompanying text (on awarding of Medicaid waivers violating
statutory requirements). For a survey of Obama administration actions testing or exceeding
the Act’s bounds, see generally Nicholas Bagley, Legal Limits and the Implementation of the
Affordable Care Act, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1715 (2016).
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eral statutes have played an active role in mobilizing new demographics118 and forging new coalitions119 whose support would
prove integral to the statutes’ long-term survival.120 For example,
both Social Security and Medicare have been celebrated for creating coalitions of seniors that, united across economic classes, have
proven important to the statutes’ durability.121 Summarizing the
findings of studies into these programs, one pair of political scientists observed: “once established, policies generate both identities

118. See, e.g., Joe Soss, Lessons of Welfare: Policy Design, Political Learning, and Political Action, 93 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 363 (1999); ANDREA LOUISE CAMPBELL, HOW POLICIES
MAKE CITIZENS: SENIOR POLITICAL ACTIVISM AND THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE (2003);
Suzanne Mettler, Bringing the State Back in to Civic Engagement: Policy Feedback Effects
of the G.I. Bill for World War II Veterans, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 351 (2002); Vesla M. Weaver
& Amy E. Lerman, Political Consequences of the Carceral State, 104 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 817
(2010); SUZANNE METTLER, THE SUBMERGED STATE: HOW INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT POLICIES
UNDERMINE AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2011); see also Jacob S. Hacker & Paul Pierson, After
the “Master Theory”: Downs, Schattschneider, and the Rebirth of Policy-Focused Analysis,
12 PERSP. ON POL. 643, 645 (2014) (reviewing this literature).
119. See, e.g., THEDA SKOCPOL, DIMINISHED DEMOCRACY: FROM MEMBERSHIP TO
MANAGEMENT IN AMERICAN CIVIC LIFE (2003); Theda Skocpol, Government Activism and
the Reorganization of American Civic Democracy, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
POLITICS (Paul Pierson & Theda Skocpol eds., 2007); Frank R. Baumgartner, Beth L. Leech
& Christine Mahoney, The Co-evolution of Groups and Government (Aug. 28, 2003) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author); Beth L. Leech, Frank R. Baumgartner, Timothy
M. La Pira & Nicholas A. Semanko, Drawing Lobbyists to Washington: Government Activity
and the Demand for Advocacy, 58 POL. RES. Q. 19 (2005); TERRY M. MOE, SPECIAL INTEREST:
TEACHERS UNIONS AND AMERICA’S PUBLIC SCHOOLS (2011); Margaret Weir & Theda
Skocpol, State Structures and the Possibilities for ‘Keynesian’ Responses to the Great Depression in Sweden, Britain, and the United States, in BRINGING THE STATE BACK IN 107 (Evans
et al. eds., 1985); ERIC M. PATASHNIK, REFORMS AT RISK: WHAT HAPPENS AFTER MAJOR
POLICY CHANGES ARE ENACTED (2008); E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, POLITICS, PRESSURES AND
THE TARIFF (1935); see also Hacker & Pierson, supra note 118, at 645–47 (reviewing this
literature).
120. Strong support coalitions have been viewed as an essential ingredient of statutory
entrenchment, as defined in the political science literature. See Jacob S. Hacker & Paul
Pierson, The Dog That Almost Barked: What the ACA Repeal Fight Says About the Resilience
of the American Welfare State, 43 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 551, 563–64 (2018) (summarizing this finding).
121. CAMPBELL, supra note 118; see also KAREN ORREN & STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE
SEARCH FOR AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 98–101 (2004); THEDA SKOCPOL,
PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE POLITICAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE
UNITED STATES (1992) [hereinafter SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS]; Suzanne Mettler & Joe Soss, The Consequences of Public Policy for Democratic Citizenship:
Bridging Policy Studies and Mass Politics, 2 PERSP. ON POL. 55, 62–65 (2004); Paul Pierson,
Fragmented Welfare States: Federal Institutions and the Development of Social Policy, 8
GOVERNANCE 449 (1995); Jacobs & Callaghan, supra note 94, at 1037–38; Colleen M.
Grogan, Political-Economic Factors Influencing State Medicaid Policy, 47 POL. RES. Q. 589,
595 (1994); Colleen M. Grogan, The Influence of Federal Mandates on State Medicaid and
AFDC Decision-Making, PUBLIUS, Summer 1999, at 1, 10.
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and groups that equate their interests with programmatic continuation and expansion and generate resources to mobilize beneficiaries.”122
The ACA has not only underscored the continued validity of
these lessons, but has also made clear the importance of specifically building coalitions that, in the modern hyperpartisan era, can
serve to fracture partisan lines. In several ways, the Act’s design
ruptured existing coalitions and created new ones that have been
important to the Act’s enduring successes. Most notably, the Act
created a new coalition of millions of individuals who have gained
health insurance due to the Act’s reforms.123 This new coalition has
helped turn the tide of public support in favor of the Act as its reforms have rolled out—a crucial element of ensuring that the statute survives beyond an initial, sympathetic federal administration.
The Act also proves instructive on how coalitions can prompt
progress on social justice agendas in states whose political leadership proves resistant. Consider the handful of Republican-controlled states that elected to expand Medicaid, bucking the trend
of their red sister-states.124 Studies have pointed toward at least
two factors that may have contributed to these seemingly counterintuitive expansion decisions. First, one study found evidence supporting the thesis that, in these states, a policy history of past Medicaid generosity has muted the role of partisanship in Medicaid
expansion decisions.125 The study postulated that this may have
occurred partly because earlier Medicaid policies had created
stronger and broader coalitions in support of a robust Medicaid

122. Jacobs & Callaghan, supra note 94, at 1037.
123. On the number of individuals who arguably owe their health insurance to the Act’s
reforms, see supra note 15. See also Gluck & Scott-Railton, supra note 28, at 557 (arguing
that the ACA’s direct provision of benefits to the middle class was key to its entrenchment).
124. As Metzger noted in 2015: “A steady trickle of states with either Republican governors or Republican-controlled legislatures, or both, have expanded Medicaid since 2012.
This includes some solid-red states like Indiana and Montana, while governors in other red
states like Idaho, Utah, Tennessee, and Wyoming have or are discussing expansion waivers
with HHS.” Metzger, Agencies, supra note 28, at 1783–84.
125. Jacobs & Callaghan, supra note 94. For studies finding this pull of past policy decisions as a force in health care in prior contexts, see Kim & Jennings, supra note 84, and
Henry R. Glick & Scott P. Hays, Innovation and Reinvention in State Policymaking: Theory
and the Evolution of Living Will Laws, 53 J. POL. 835 (1991).
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program in those states.126 If true, it means that the ACA’s leveraging of a preexisting coalition may have served as a driver of
wider geographical impact.
A second set of studies, looking at both the Medicaid expansion
and the creation of state-based Exchanges in Republican-controlled states, has pointed to the coalition-related effects that these
policies triggered within the Republican Party. On the one hand,
the Act gave rise to a vitriolic Tea Party movement that was devoted to undermining it. A coalition of conservative interest groups
(including Cato, the American Legislative Exchange Council
(“ALEC”), the State Policy Network, Americans for Prosperity
(“AFP”), and the Heritage Foundation) was extremely effective at
bringing pressure upon Republican state-level officials.127 ALEC,
for example, which authored The State Legislator’s Guide to Repealing Obamacare, sent individuals to advocate to state legislators for “absolute non-collaboration” with the Act, and pressured
governors into non-cooperation with the Act.128 In 2014, AFP spent
over $30 million on advertisements against the Act.129 This coalition was a powerful agent in undermining the Act’s entrenchment
at the state level.
However, studies have noted that the Act’s policies also gave rise
to countervailing coalitions that influenced some Republican leaders. Hospital and provider groups strongly supported Medicaid expansion (as it would increase funding for uncompensated care)130

126. Jacobs & Callaghan, supra note 94, at 1036.
127. See Jones et al., supra note 97, at 114; Hertel-Fernandez et al., supra note 91, at
246–47; Simon F. Haeder & David L. Weimer, You Can’t Make Me Do It: State Implementation of Insurance Exchanges Under the Affordable Care Act, 73 PUB. ADMIN. REV. S34, S39
(2013); Kelly Kennedy, Conservatives Campaign Against Insurance Exchanges, ABC NEWS
(May 29, 2012, 4:47 PM) https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/conservatives-campaign-insuran
ce-exchanges/story?id=16453150 [https://perma.cc/SGU3-HHPM].
128. See Jones et al., supra note 97, at 119; Jason Millman & J. Lester Feder, Exchanges
Hit Roadblocks in Red States, POLITICO (Apr. 18, 2012, 11:33 PM), www.politico.com/stor
y/2012/04/exchanges-hit-roadblocks-in-red-states-075331 [https://perma.cc/9WKM-RJLK]
(last updated Apr. 30, 2012, 3:20 PM).
129. Glenn Kessler, ‘Billions’ Spent on Attacking Obamacare?, WASH. POST (Apr. 4, 2014,
6:15 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2014/04/04/billions-spent
-on-attacking-obamacare/ [https://perma.cc/W4DX-3336].
130. Grogan & Park, supra note 83, at 550–51; Hertel-Fernandez et al., supra note 91,
at 244 (“Virtually everywhere, for instance, hospitals and hospital associations have pushed
for states to accept Medicaid expansion.”); see also Brianne Pfannenstiel, Missouri Chamber
of Commerce Backs Medicaid Expansion, KAN. CITY BUS. J. (Mar. 13, 2013), https://www.biz
journals.com/kansascity/news/2013/03/13/missouri-chamber-of-commerce-backs.html [http
s://perma.cc/KZQ6-5UQL]; Robin Flagg, Medicaid Expansion: A Tale of Two Governors, 41
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and sometimes also supported the establishment of state-based Exchanges.131 Parts of the insurance industry, sensing potentially enlarged markets, also supported Exchanges and Medicaid expansion.132 These and other in-state economic interests led a number
of business groups (such as chambers of commerce) to support
state-based Exchanges133 or Medicaid expansion,134 although this
support was varied.135 Indeed, state chapters of the National Federation of Independent Business (“NFIB”) sometimes supported
the creation of state-based Exchanges, despite their high-profile legal challenge to the Act.136 These economically focused groups combined with labor unions, faith-based groups, disabilities rights advocates, and others to advocate for cooperation with the Act’s
programs.137
These coalitions were helpful in numerous ways. In addition to
applying political pressure to state governments, some hospital
groups encouraged hospital CEOs to write op-eds, distribute fact
sheets, and hold community forums.138 The Blue Cross and Blue
Shield Association, in its efforts to devise strategies to surmount
conservative opposition to state-based Exchanges, coined the term
“marketplace” as a descriptor for the Exchanges, a term which the
Obama administration eventually would adopt.139

J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & LAW 997 (2016) (detailing support in Wisconsin and Ohio).
131. Haeder & Weimer, supra note 127, at S38 (detailing support of Arkansas Hospital
Association and others).
132. See Jones et al., supra note 97, at 121; see also Dean Olsen, Legislators to Consider
Illinois Health-Care Exchange, WICKED LOC. (Nov. 5, 2011, 5:03 AM), https://provincetown.
wickedlocal.com/x1234472147/Legislators-to-consider-Illinois-health-care-exchange [https:
//perma.cc/3Q6H-WY5S] (example of Illinois); Haeder & Weimer, supra note 127, at S40;
Flagg, supra note 130, at 1019 (citing support of Care Source Health Plan, an insurer offering Medicaid-managed care plans); Hertel-Fernandez et al., supra note 91, at 256 (citing
support of Michigan Association of Health Plans).
133. See T.R. Goldman, Colorado’s Health Insurance Exchange: How One State Has So
Far Forged a Bipartisan Path Through the Partisan Wilderness, 31 HEALTH AFF. 332, 333–
34 (2012) (in Colorado); see also Olsen, supra note 132 (in Illinois).
134. See Hertel-Fernandez et al., supra note 91, at 244–45, 255–57 (in Missouri and
Michigan).
135. Id. at 245 (“However, we do observe variation in chamber proclivities and capacities
to channel the overall desire of health care businesses to see Medicaid expanded in some
form in every state.”).
136. Goldman, supra note 133, at 333–34.
137. See Flagg, supra note 130, at 1019–20 (noting SEIU and others); see also Gluck &
Scott-Railton, supra note 28, at 541 (noting newly formed and previously existing interest
groups defending the Act post-enactment).
138. Hertel-Fernandez et al., supra note 91, at 256.
139. Jones et al., supra note 97, at 121.
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These interesting contributions notwithstanding, the evidence
regarding the ultimate impact of these business-oriented coalitions
is mixed.140 Nonetheless, two different studies have suggested that,
in Republican-controlled states, decisions about Medicaid expansion141 and Exchange creation142 might be explained by the competing strength of these business coalitions, as opposed to the Tea
Party coalitions, within the state. The experience of the ACA therefore recommends policy designs that might fracture (and enlist segments of) coalitions that could otherwise be united in opposition.143
Meanwhile, the rise of the Tea Party coalition, and the shape of
its opposition to the Act, offers a secondary lesson. In a hyperpartisan climate, it shows that political opposition may take the form
of calls for total non-cooperation with any federal program. In the
case of the Exchanges, where non-cooperation simply led to the creation of federal Exchanges, the political energy and resources of
this opposing coalition were directed toward lobbying efforts that,
if achieved, had only remote impacts upon the success or failure of
the ACA’s ultimate goals. In this way, the study of coalitions arising from the ACA reinforces the lesson regarding statutory safeguards offered in Part II, as it shows that such safeguards may
channel opposing coalitions to pursue forms of political opposition
that are less threatening to the statute’s objectives.
Finally, the ACA also offers a lesson about allies and coalitions
within the architecture of government. At the state level, various
actors have been entrusted with key decisions regarding participation in the Act’s reforms, and also with oversight of the Act’s implementation.144 Several studies have found that, among these actors, there are differences in their embrace and pursuit of the Act’s
reforms. Specifically, state insurance commissioners have proven
particularly inclined to support these reforms—governors less so,

140. Flagg, supra note 130, at 1019–22 (finding different impacts in case studies of Wisconsin and Ohio).
141. Id. at 1014–19.
142. Id. at 1011–12.
143. By contrast, organized opposition to ACA repeal by interest groups (and also Republican governors) did not significantly translate at the federal level into Republican legislators voting against repeal. See Hacker & Pierson, supra note 120.
144. On the entrenchment benefits of involving state governments generally in ACA implementation, see Gluck & Scott-Railton, supra note 28, at 568–70.
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and state legislators least of all.145 This suggests that, when designing a federalism-based program, it can be impactful to steer
decisions that are entrusted to states toward those actors most inclined to sympathize with the Act’s mission and agenda, to the extent possible.
IV. THE BENEFITS (AND COSTS) OF BUILDING ON ENTRENCHED
PROGRAMS
Thus far, we have written about the lessons that the ACA offers
for statutory design largely as though legislators were writing onto
a blank slate, considering anew whether to select federal funding
models and how to build coalitions. But of course, that is far from
the case. The modern administrative state is built upon layers of
accreted federal and state control over a complex array of regulatory programs.146 Such varying arrangements are on full display in
health care, where the federal government runs the Medicare program for elderly Americans, but jointly administers Medicaid with
the states.147
The ACA had to be designed with these longstanding federalist
arrangements in mind. Its drafters made several impactful decisions in this regard, choosing in one case to expand an existing program (Medicaid), and in another to create a new program (the Exchanges). The differing experiences of these two reforms illuminate
the tradeoffs that, in our modern political climate, come with building upon an existing federalist program. An existing program often
benefits from entrenchment, by which we mean the phenomenon
of becoming an accepted part of the system and thereby gaining
legitimacy and durability.148 This entrenchment can take at least
three forms, each of which is explored below: (1) legal entrenchment, (2) political entrenchment, and (3) administrative entrenchment. When reformers design a new project as an expansion of a

145. Gluck & Huberfeld, supra note 3, at 1733, 1740, 1770–71; Haeder & Weimer, supra
note 127, at S40.
146. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
147. See supra section II.A.
148. We use the term “entrenchment” in a broader sense than the political science literature, which focuses centrally on the coalitions discussed in the prior Part. See Hacker &
Pierson, supra note 120, at 554 (explaining the political science focus on entrenchment as
“the ways in which various individuals and groups become invested in particular programs
and thus gain increased incentive to defend them”).
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current federal program, they might hope that the benefits afforded by each of these types of entrenchment will transfer to their
new project. The experience of the ACA suggests, however, that
these entrenchment-related benefits do not unfold in hyperpartisan climates in the manner which one might expect—although
benefits do still appear to flow from building new programs on existing federalist structures.
A. Legal Entrenchment
When statutory architects build upon an existing legal program,
they might first and foremost expect to benefit from what we term
“legal entrenchment.” This expectation derives from the fact that,
in the case of an existing program, the courts presumably already
have approved the program’s legality. In other words, the judicial
system has already reconciled itself to the program as a part of the
nation’s legal landscape, and it has built up a body of doctrines and
case law supporting this position. By scaffolding reforms upon an
existing program, reformers might expect to reap the benefits of
this legal entrenchment by avoiding court cases challenging the legality of the fundamental architecture of their project.
Legal theory might lead one to believe that, of the different types
of entrenchment, legal entrenchment should be particularly
strong. Our legal system is regularly praised for its ability, in the
midst of rapidly shifting political currents, to provide much-needed
stability and orderly growth.149 Voters may be fickle, the logic goes,

149. This principle often gets discussed with respect to the common law, see, for example,
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 7 (2009) (discussing the orderly process
of common law growth whereby “old form receives a new content, and in time . . . modifies
itself to fit the meaning which it has received”), but it plainly also applies to constitutional
interpretation, see, for example, 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE (2014) (contrasting
nations that underwent transformative change via revolutionary fervor with the American
tradition of providing constitutional change only as the culmination of prolonged national
dialogue), as well as statutory interpretation, see, for example, WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. &
JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES 168 (2010) (discussing “the old idea of stare de
statute, that statutes can be considered precedents, embodying principles that can be the
basis for legal reasoning and policies”). The principle of stare decisis captures these values
as well, of course—a principle that courts typically apply with added strength to statutory
precedents. See Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 284 (1972); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1362 (1988) (describing the Court’s “super-strong” stare decisis in statutory cases).

CROSS WELTON 553 (DO NOT DELETE)

800

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

4/22/2021 8:52 AM

[Vol. 55:765

but courts are committed to steady, reasoned elaboration. As a result, legal entrenchment should be one of the more reliable forms
of entrenchment.
However, the ACA experience raises deep questions about the
power of legal entrenchment. This was underscored by NFIB v.
Sebelius, the case reviewing the constitutionality of the ACA. Most
expected that case to be a referendum on the legality of the individual mandate, a central (and politically controversial) feature of
the Exchange-based reform that did not build upon an existing program. Surprisingly, however, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the individual mandate while declaring the Medicaid expansion, as drafted, to be unconstitutional.150 The Court adopted this
position despite the well-settled legality of Medicaid, including its
longstanding requirements that states cover certain mandatory
populations.151 Beyond Medicaid, moreover, this type of statutory

150. See NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 546–89 (2012). On the surprise of this ruling,
see Wendy K. Mariner, Leonard H. Glantz & George J. Annas, Reframing Federalism—The
Affordable Care Act (and Broccoli) in the Supreme Court, 367 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 1154, 1154
(2012).
151. On its settled constitutional status, see KATHLEEN S. SWENDIMAN, CONG. RES.
SERV., R40846, HEALTH CARE: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND LEGISLATIVE POWERS 10
(2012), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40846.pdf [https://perma.cc/XQ7K-6P7Q] (“The Supreme Court has not taken a case challenging [the Medicare, Medicaid, or CHIP] programs
as an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’s taxing and spending power, possibly because
the law on this point was settled by its earlier 1937 decision [in Steward Machine Co. v.
Davis] upholding Title II (Old Age Benefits) and Title III (Unemployment Compensation) of
the same act.”). On mandatory requirements coverage, see Social Security Amendments of
1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 121, 79 Stat. 286, 288, 344–45 (specifying under section
1902(a)(10) of the original Medicaid statute that state plans must “provide for making medical assistance available to all individuals receiving aid or assistance under State plans approved under titles I, IV, X, XIV, and XVI”). Also, Congress has routinely expanded the
Medicaid program by adding to the list of required conditions that states must meet to qualify for program participation. See, e.g., Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, §
6062(a)(1)(A), 120 Stat. 4, 96–97 (adding subclause XIX); Breast and Cervical Cancer Prevention and Treatment Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-354, § 2(a)(1), 114 Stat. 1381, 1381
(adding subclause XVIII); Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4733, 111
Stat. 251, 522 (adding subclause XIII); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L.
No. 103-66, § 13603(a)(1)(3), 107 Stat. 312, 619–20 (adding subclause XII); Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 4601(a)(1)(A), 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-166
(adding subclause VII); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, §
6401(a)(1), 103 Stat. 2106, 2258 (adding subclause VI); Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act
of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-360, § 302(a)(1)(A), 102 Stat. 683, 750–51 (adding subclause IV);
see also Nicole Huberfeld, Elizabeth Weeks Leonard & Kevin Outterson, Plunging into Endless Difficulties: Medicaid and Coercion in National Federation of Independent Business v.
Sebelius, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1, 21 (2013) (“The NFIB plurality fundamentally misunderstood
this history, leading it to overemphasize discontinuities between the existing Medicaid program and the Medicaid expansion. The plurality artificially split Medicaid into two programs: old and new.”).
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design, with its conditional spending arrangement, has long been
permitted by the Court.152 The underlying program, its conditionalspending structure, and the ACA’s method of expanding it all were
legally entrenched, in other words. Yet the Court struck it down
anyway.
In the current legal–political climate, then, is the idea that there
is a benefit to building on preexisting programs illusory? We argue
it is not—but that the benefits are largely political and administrative, rather than legal, as we describe below.
B. Political Entrenchment
A second type of entrenchment can be termed “political entrenchment.” When a federal program endures for several decades
(or several generations), it may become an entrenched part of our
political culture—which is to say, it may lose its partisan valence
and gain a broader, bipartisan base of political support, acceptance, and legitimacy.153 Legal scholars have noted this statutory political entrenchment, particularly with respect to landmark
statutes,154 and there is reason to think it may extend to a broader
category of federal statutes as well155—an idea with significant
support in political science literature.156 When a program becomes
152. Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Anti-Leveraging Principle and the Spending Clause After
NFIB, 101 GEO. L.J. 861, 864 (2013) (“An enormous amount of the New Deal/Great Society
state is built on conditional spending statutes.”).
153. John D. Skrentny and Micah Gell-Redman aptly describe this political entrenchment, saying: “In our understanding, entrenchment is akin to what political scientists, sociologists, and organizational theorists call ‘institutionalization.’ . . . In this view, a statutory model becomes entrenched when it becomes taken for granted as a rational approach
to achieve some objective . . . .” John D. Skrentny & Micah Gell-Redman, Comprehensive
Immigration Reform and the Dynamics of Statutory Entrenchment, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE
325, 328 (2011).
154. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE JR. & FEREJOHN, supra note 149, at 114 (describing and documenting the process by which landmark statutes become “entrenched,” by which they “mean
that it is beyond partisan debate”); id. at 188 (on the mechanics of entrenchment through
the pivot from conflict to consensus); ACKERMAN, supra note 149, at 71 (describing the process by which landmark statutes undergo “consolidation”); William N. Eskridge Jr. & John
Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215, 1216 (2001) (describing related concepts regarding the creation of “super-statutes” that “over time . . . ‘stick’ in the public culture”).
155. John Gramlich, Few Americans Support Cuts to Most Government Programs, Including Medicaid, PEW RES. CTR. (May 26, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/
2017/05/26/few-americans-support-cuts-to-most-government-programs-including-medicaid/
[https://perma.cc/S2DX-PYW7].
156. This literature has found, for example, that entrenchment makes statutory repeal
increasingly less likely with time. See Hacker & Pierson, supra note 120, at 559 (citing Jordan Michael Ragusa, The Lifecycle of Public Policy: An Event History Analysis of Repeals to
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politically entrenched in this way, statutory drafters might consider framing their proposals as expansions of the existing federal
program because they suspect that, in so doing, they might transfer its existing political support to their own project.
The ACA provides nuanced lessons regarding these political-entrenchment benefits. At the outset, the experience of the Medicaid
expansion warns reformers not to overestimate these benefits.
Post-enactment studies have consistently found partisanship to
have been the overriding determinant of support for, and adoption
of, the reforms in the Act—a finding that has been uncovered with
respect to the Medicaid expansion as well as the Exchange-based
reform.157 Consistent with this finding, the twelve states that have
not adopted the Medicaid expansion overwhelmingly are subject to
Republican control.158 The Medicaid expansion was thus not able
to escape politicization simply by building upon the existing Medicaid program.
Nonetheless, the Medicaid expansion has consistently enjoyed
greater levels of public support than the ACA in general. In July
2012, only thirty-eight percent of individuals had a favorable view
of the Act (with a slightly lower percentage supporting the individual mandate), whereas sixty-seven percent supported the concept
of Medicaid expansion in general and forty-nine percent supported
expansion by their state.159 While support for the Act overall has
Landmark Legislative Enactments, 1951–2006, 38 AM. POL. RES. 1015, 1018, 1028 (2010)).
For an overview of the political science entrenchment literature more broadly, see supra
note 148.
157. Jones et al., supra note 97, at 130–31; LAWRENCE R. JACOBS & THEDA SKOCPOL,
HEALTH CARE REFORM AND AMERICAN POLITICS: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 6–8
(2012); Jacobs & Callaghan, supra note 94, at 1024–26; Flagg, supra note 130, at 1000–01;
Hertel-Fernandez et al., supra note 91, at 243; Barrilleaux & Rainey, supra note 94, at 448,
453; see also Robert Pear & Michael Cooper, Reluctance in Some States over Medicaid Expansion, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2012), www.nytimes.com/2012/06/30/us/politics/some-statesreluctant-over-medicaid-expansion.html?pagewanted=all
[https://perma.cc/F4CZ-JM52];
Jonathan Oberlander, Under Siege—The Individual Mandate for Health Insurance and Its
Alternatives, 364 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 1085, 1086–87 (2011).
158. Of the twelve states that have not adopted the expansion, all but three are states
where Republicans control both chambers of the legislature as well as the governorship. The
remaining three (North Carolina, Kansas, and Wisconsin) have divided governments. Compare Medicaid Expansion Decisions, supra note 53, with Gubernatorial and Legislative
Party Control of State Government, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Gubernatorial_
and_legislative_party_control_of_state_government [https://perma.cc/RT9H-RBQ5].
159. July Kaiser Health Tracking Poll: A Focus on the Mandate and the Medicaid Expansion in the Aftermath of the Supreme Court Decision, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (July 31,
2012), https://www.kff.org/health-reform/perspective/july-kaiser-health-tracking-poll-a-foc
us-on-the-mandate-and-the-medicaid-expansion-in-the-aftermath-of-the-supreme-court-
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increased in subsequent years—peaking at fifty-four percent in
2018, and currently at fifty-three percent—it still has not kept pace
with support for the Medicaid expansion.160 As of November 2018,
there was seventy-seven percent support for providing states with
the option to expand Medicaid, and a startling fifty-nine percent of
individuals in current non-expansion states reported wanting their
states to adopt expansion (versus only thirty-four percent opposed).161
Even among those political actors most resistant to the ACA, vitriol was focused primarily on the Exchange-based reforms. By
early 2011, twelve states had considered constitutional amendments prohibiting the individual mandate,162 and by late 2016, five
states passed constitutional amendments prohibiting state-based
Exchanges or compulsory participation in health care markets.163
Fourteen additional states had passed laws or resolutions to this
end by late 2016.164 In Idaho, both legislative chambers went so far
as to pass a resolution calling for an amendment to the federal
Constitution prohibiting Congress from mandating health care
market participation.165 By contrast, the Medicaid expansion,
while certainly an object of political backlash in several states,
never received these levels of state-sanctioned criticism and resistance.166

decision/ [https://perma.cc/5HLY-EJZU].
160. See KFF Health Tracking Poll: The Public’s Views on the ACA, KAISER FAM. FOUND.
(Dec. 18, 2020), https://www.kff.org/interactive/kff-health-tracking-poll-the-publics-viewson
-the-aca/#?response=Favorable—Unfavorable&aRange=twoyear [https://perma.cc/3ULF-Y
PTW].
161. Ashley Kirzinger, Bryan Wu & Mollyann Brodie, KFF Health Tracking Poll—November 2018: Priorities for New Congress and the Future of the ACA and Medicaid Expansion, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.kff.org/health-reform/poll-finding
/kff-health-tracking-poll-november-2018-priorities-congress-future-aca-medicaid-expansio
n/ [https://perma.cc/C9FT-NEET].
162. See Jones et al., supra note 97, at 112.
163. Legal Cases and State Legislative Actions Related to the ACA, NAT’L CONF. ST.
LEGISLATURES (Nov. 10, 2020), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-laws-and-actionschallenging-ppaca.aspx [https://perma.cc/WB4N-Z8MX] (listing Alabama, Arizona, Ohio,
Oklahoma, and Wyoming).
164. Id. (listing Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri,
Montana, New Hampshire, North Dakota, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia).
165. See id.
166. For state actions voicing resistance to Medicaid expansion, see id. For the argument
that the Medicaid expansion’s popularity was the key factor preventing Congress from successfully repealing and replacing the Act, see Gluck & Scott-Railton, supra note 28, at 500.
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Indeed, the uniquely unpopular nature of the individual mandate still may prove to be the undoing of the entire ACA, though
such a result is not expected. To date, this mandate is the only major policy from the Act that political opponents in Congress have
mustered the support to repeal.167 A district court has held that
this repeal introduced a constitutional infirmity that rendered the
entire Act unconstitutional, and a Fifth Circuit panel, agreeing
that the repeal created an unconstitutional provision, remanded
for additional district court analysis on the severability issue.168
The case is now proceeding before the Supreme Court, where oral
arguments hinted that the Court is unlikely to strike down the Act.
Nonetheless, it is notable that this series of events, which threaten
the entirety of the Act, began with Congress capitalizing upon the
uniquely unpopular nature of the individual mandate.
Measured by several metrics, in other words, the Medicaid expansion has steadily received greater political support than the Exchange-based reforms (and the individual mandate in particular).
Why has this proven true? Although there are no easy answers,
many of the political attacks against the Exchanges focused on the
“unprecedented” nature of the individual mandate.169 Despite the
availability of analogues and precedents in prior law,170 these cri-

167. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11081, 131 Stat. 2054,
2092 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 5000A).
168. Li Zhou, The Latest Legal Challenge to the Affordable Care Act, Explained, VOX
(July 10, 2019), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/7/9/20686224/affordable-careact-constitutional-lawsuit-fifth-circuit-court-texas-district-court [https://perma.cc/WB4N-Z
8MX].
169. See, e.g., Randy Barnett, Nathaniel Stewart & Todd Gaziano, Why the Personal
Mandate to Buy Health Insurance Is Unprecedented and Unconstitutional, HERITAGE
FOUND. (Dec. 9, 2009), https://www.heritage.org/health-care-reform/report/why-the-person
al-mandate-buy-health-insurance-unprecedented-and#_ftn1 [https://perma.cc/8RQP-8H9
X]; Dylan Scott, A Requiem for the Individual Mandate, VOX (Apr. 13, 2018, 9:00 AM),
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/4/13/17226566/obamacare-penalty-2018-indi
vidual-mandate-still-in-effect [https://perma.cc/MFV9-M9WN] (quoting John Boehner as
describing the mandate as an “unprecedented, unconstitutional power grab by the federal
government”); JOSH BLACKMAN, UNPRECEDENTED 47 (2013); Facts About PPACA Individual
Mandate, CribSheet 12-2, NAT’L FED’N INDEP. BUS. (Feb. 15, 2012), https://www.nfib.com/cri
bsheets/individual-mandate/ [https://perma.cc/8L5P-M7NG].
170. See Jennifer B. Wriggins, Is the Health Insurance Individual Mandate “Unprecedented”?: The Case of Auto Insurance Mandates 1, 4–5 (2012) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2011025 [https://perma.cc/F8H9-8UP
C] (noting state mandates to buy automobile insurance); Public Health Service Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 300gg—300gg–95 (showing Public Health Service Act prior to the amendments by
the Affordable Care Act, which applied many ACA individual market reforms to employer
market).
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tiques of the “unprecedented” nature of the Exchanges proved relatively easy to wage against a reform that—in addition to having
several genuinely novel features—was framed as a new landmark
project, not an expansion of an old program.
By contrast, fewer critics attacked the Medicaid expansion as an
“unprecedented” reform. Such claims were not entirely absent—
indeed, Chief Justice Roberts made precisely this claim in NFIB v.
Sebelius—yet these arguments typically proved less compelling in
the political arena.171 As such, the differing nature of the public
debates over the Act’s two reforms suggests that the heightened
popularity of the Medicaid expansion may have been partly attributable to its design as an expansion of a politically entrenched
(and therefore not “unprecedented”) federal program.
The experience of the ACA therefore suggests that public support for existing federal programs can, to a modest degree, translate into support for new reforms framed as expansions of the prior
federal program. (Interestingly, certain Democrats seem to have
reached this same conclusion, as revealed by recent efforts to frame
single-payer health care reform as “Medicare for All.”172) Such additional support may be particularly needed for reforms in the current era in which, as political scientists have noted in studying the
ACA, hyperpartisanship otherwise translates into new statutes experiencing surprisingly muted early levels of entrenchment.173
For those interested in maximizing state participation in a federal program, this lesson is noteworthy, as state governmental decisions appear at least somewhat responsive to public opinion.
Prior research has suggested that program-specific political support is a factor that, in many instances, is predictive of state policy
decisions.174 Moreover, at least one study has found that overall

171. See NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 583 (2012) (“The Medicaid expansion, however,
accomplishes a shift in kind, not merely degree.”).
172. See Jessie Hellmann, ‘Medicare for All’ Complicates Democrats’ Pitch to Retake Senate, HILL (Aug. 8, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/456574-medicarefor-all-divide-complicates-democrats-pitch-to-retake-senate [https://perma.cc/3PZU-GYV2].
173. See Hacker & Pierson, supra note 120, at 564, 574.
174. Jeffrey R. Lax & Justin H. Phillips, The Democratic Deficit in the States, 56 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 148, 149 (2012). But see Jeffrey R. Lax & Justin H. Phillips, Gay Rights in the
States: Public Opinion and Policy Responsiveness, 103 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 367 (2009) (finding
less connection to public opinion when issue is both highly politically salient and requires a
supermajority to adopt).
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public support for the Medicaid expansion, in particular, has correlated with state expansion decisions.175 It is thus not surprising
that thirty-eight states have participated in the Medicaid expansion, whereas only fifteen have adopted a state Exchange (and
twelve more have adopted a hybrid Exchange).176
This contrast in state participation suggests that the Medicaid
expansion has achieved greater levels of state participation in part
through its successful leveraging of Medicaid’s existing political
entrenchment.177 Indeed, it raises pointed questions about whether
the goals of the Act’s Exchange-based reforms could have been
more fully achieved by designing (and framing) them as an expansion of the Public Health Service Act’s protections regarding employer health plans, rather than as a new federal intervention.
That said, we must note that building the ACA upon the politically entrenched Medicaid model has also created new risks for the
Medicaid program itself. Among the general public, the Medicaid
program has maintained high levels of bipartisan support in the
wake of the Medicaid expansion.178 However, the story is different
with respect to political elites. These elites, following a highly politicized program expansion such as Medicaid, may come to view
once-settled political contestations over the existing program as
newly reopened.

175. Grogan & Park, supra note 83, at 552. These researchers additionally found a racial
bias, it should be noted, that makes states more attuned to white public opinion in the state.
176. See Hacker & Pierson, supra note 120, at 569–70 (noting that the benefits of public
opinion or state government support may not translate to the federal level with similar
force, as Republican members of Congress supported ACA repeal in ways that defied both
public opinion and, in expansion states, their own Republican governors); see also Norris,
supra note 79. But see Gluck & Huberfeld, supra note 3 (arguing that such tallying is misleading because it elides the fact that there has been a nuanced spectrum of implementation
decisions).
177. On the program’s bipartisan support, see Data Note: 5 Charts About Public Opinion
on Medicaid, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Feb. 20, 2020), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/poll-finding/data-note-5-charts-about-public-opinion-on-medicaid/
[https://perma.cc/RD9K-6PF4]
(showing a seventy-five percent overall favorable view of Medicaid in 2019, including a sixtyfive percent favorability rating among Republicans).
178. Dan Mangan, Medicare, Medicaid Popularity High: Kaiser, CNBC (July 17, 2015,
3:00 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2015/07/16/medicare-medicaid-popularity-high-ahead-ofbirthday.html [https://perma.cc/3SEM-UAG9]; Dylan Scott, Poll: Medicaid Is Overwhelmingly Popular, Even as Trump Looks to Cut It, VOX (Mar. 1, 2018, 10:20 AM), https://www.
vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/3/1/17066578/medicaid-work-requirements-poll-kff [https:
//perma.cc/7DHM-2VSS].
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This has been vividly illustrated by the experience with Medicaid waivers. As Part I explained, since the beginning of the Medicaid program, the Secretary of Health and Human Services has always possessed broad authority to waive various statutory
requirements in order to allow states to conduct demonstrations
that, “in the judgment of the Secretary, [are] likely to assist in promoting the objectives” of the Medicaid program.179 Technically, this
statutory grant of authority is tremendously broad; in practice,
however, its application had long been hemmed in by administrative practice and settled state-level expectations. Medicaid expansion, however, changed these norms.
As the Obama administration eagerly sought to increase state
participation in the Medicaid expansion after the Court’s opinion
in NFIB, the administration began to entice states by offering
novel waivers with respect to the expansion population. Notably,
these waivers sometimes were granted not only with respect to
state policies that changed the method of providing health care access to individuals (such as delivery system reforms), but also to
policies that predictably reduced health care access (such as program lockouts for failure to pay premiums).180 In this way, waivers
sometimes undermined, rather than promoted, the objectives of
the Medicaid program. Nonetheless, the Obama administration
viewed these waivers as a strategy by which to entrench the fledgling Act, including its Medicaid expansion.
Subsequently, however, the Trump administration expanded
this aggressive waiver policy, including, most troublingly, by beginning to apply it with respect to non-expansion populations. Consequently, various states received Medicaid waivers for policies
that predictably reduced health care access for non-expansion Medicaid populations in unprecedented ways.181 Many of these novel
179. Social Security Amendments of 1965 § 1115(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a).
180. For breakdowns of the waivers approved with respect to each state, see Medicaid
Waiver Tracker, supra note 57. The Obama administration approved the first lockout waiver
provision for a portion of the expansion population in Indiana. See Phil Galewitz, Indiana’s
Brand of Medicaid Drops 25,000 People for Failure to Pay Premiums, NPR (Feb. 1, 2018,
9:52 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2018/02/01/582295740/indianas-brand
-of-medicaid-drops-25-000-people-for-failure-to-pay-premiums [https://perma.cc/X9KD-BH
NA].
181. These include work requirement waivers, waivers relating to eligibility and enrollment, and waivers with benefit, copay, and healthy behavior provisions. For state-by-state
breakdowns of these waivers, see Medicaid Waiver Tracker, supra note 57. On the Biden
administration’s early efforts to withdraw some of these waivers, see supra note 56 and
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and far-reaching Medicaid waivers have been expansions of waiver
ideas that the Obama administration already granted with respect
to expansion populations. This reverse politicization was also observable in the failed ACA repeal effort in Congress, where Republican proposals included drastic cuts to the Medicaid program that
went far beyond a return to pre-ACA Medicaid.182 In these ways,
the partisan politics of the ACA appear to have disrupted
longstanding political settlements within the Medicaid program, to
the program’s detriment.
While this reverse politicization is troubling, it does not necessarily mean that statutory architects should avoid reforms that expand existing federal programs. Rather, it provides these architects with an important reminder that, in many instances, the
longstanding structure of a federal program is the product of a complex tangle of statutory requirements, agency rules, and settled informal understandings. Once that program is associated with a
new, hyperpartisan reform project, those settled informal understandings (and perhaps also many agency rules) may fall away,
placing new strain on the underlying statutory requirements to
sustain the structure of the program.
C. Administrative Entrenchment
A final type of entrenchment that the ACA experience speaks to
could be labeled “administrative entrenchment.” This refers to the
idea that, when a state administers a federal program over an extended period, the state often will develop a competent bureaucracy to manage the program. Eskridge and Ferejohn have spoken
to this quality of institutional entrenchment,183 and Gluck has
noted its relevance to state-level bureaucracies administering federal programs, including Medicaid.184 Chief Justice Roberts also
identified administrative entrenchment in the Medicaid context in
NFIB, remarking that threats to take away state Medicaid funds

accompanying text (discussing early steps to withdraw work requirement waivers).
182. See Hacker & Pierson, supra note 120, at 568.
183. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 149, at 114, 117.
184. Gluck, supra note 12, at 569–70 (“[D]ecentralizing the administration of federal
statutory law may more effectively entrench the new federal statute by creating a much
broader and deeper network of institutions and officials . . . who are invested in the new
federal statutory scheme, its meaning, and its success.”); see also Gluck, Federalism from
Federal Statutes, supra note 28, at 1761; Gluck & Scott-Railton, supra note 28, at 499.
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are unduly coercive partly because “the States have developed intricate statutory and administrative regimes over the course of
many decades to implement their objectives under existing Medicaid.”185
According to research from several academic fields, new reform
projects can receive two important benefits when they are designed
as expansions of administratively entrenched programs.186 First,
this entrenchment can provide state-level policymakers and stakeholders with confidence in a state’s ability to undertake additional
reform projects, thereby potentially making these pivotal actors
more receptive to such projects.187 Second, this entrenchment provides state governments with a heightened capacity to design and
implement these new programs, ideally resulting in greater effectiveness and efficiency in program administration.188
In theory, therefore, administrative entrenchment should offer
increased likelihood of adoption and increased effectiveness in implementation. In practice, the experience of the ACA reflects these
predictions, albeit with some wrinkles caused by hyperpartisanship.189 At least two studies of the Act’s implementation have concluded that, despite the overriding role of partisanship, existing
state administrative capacity still increased the likelihood of states
undertaking the Medicaid expansion.190 In particular, these studies suggest that administrative capacity may have played a role in
185. NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 581 (2012).
186. The scholarship cited in the following footnotes includes work by organizational
economists, political scientists, and health policy analysts.
187. Jacobs & Callaghan, supra note 94, at 1038 (lauding “administrative capacity” on
these grounds); Paul Pierson, Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 251, 252, 258 (2000); see also SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS
AND MOTHERS, supra note 121; Theda Skocpol & John Ikenberry, The Political Formation
of the American Welfare State in Historical and Comparative Context, 6 COMP. SOC. RES. 87
(1983).
188. See, e.g., John Holahan, Stephen Zuckerman, Alison Evans & Suresh Rangarajan,
Medicaid Managed Care in Thirteen States, 17 HEALTH AFF. 43 (1998); Marsha Gold, Michael Sparer & Karyen Chu, Marketwatch: Medicaid Managed Care: Lessons from Five
States, 15 HEALTH AFF. 153 (1996); Charles Barrilleaux, Richard Feiock & Robert E. Crew,
Jr., Measuring and Comparing American States’ Administrative Characteristics, ST. & LOC.
GOV’T REV. 12 (1992); see also Jacobs & Callaghan, supra note 94, at 1025–26.
189. See supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text (on prior studies showing that partisanship is tempered by state economic need, and on current studies showing that the Medicaid expansion has been largely immune to this countervailing influence).
190. Jacobs & Callaghan, supra note 94, at 1040–41; Haeder & Weimer, supra note 127,
at S42 (“Although some caution is needed in light of the small number of observations, it
appears that, consistent with our qualitative analysis, both politics and administrative capacity make a difference [in implementation].”).
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convincing a handful of Republican-controlled states to adopt the
expansion. As one study described it: “Partisanship is a constraint,
but it is not a death sentence. [The Medicaid expansion suggests
that] [e]nhanced administrative resources and attention to established policy trajectories may offer strategic levers and points of
intervention to moderate the depressive effects of party control
where they exist.”191
In light of these studies, it is reasonable to conclude that prior
administrative entrenchment of the Medicaid program has been
another factor contributing to the comparatively high rate of state
participation in Medicaid expansion, relative to Exchange participation. As such, it provides another reason, albeit a modest one, to
consider designing new reforms as expansions of existing federalism-oriented programs.
The experience of the Medicaid expansion more clearly affirms
the continued relevance of the second benefit cited by research into
administrative entrenchment: more effective and successful implementation among participating states. In the case of the Exchanges, several states that created state Exchanges found themselves overwhelmed by technical and administrative difficulties—
setbacks so severe that some states entirely abandoned their state
Exchanges in favor of hybrid or federally run Exchanges.192 By contrast, no state appears to have encountered comparable administrative setbacks in its Medicaid expansion. There is good reason to
think that these contrasts in implementation are attributable, in
significant part, to the fact that the Medicaid expansion utilized
entrenched state-level Medicaid administrations, whereas the Exchange-based reforms did not draw upon comparable state-level
bureaucracies (or, at a minimum, required entrenched state-level
bureaucrats to undertake relatively novel tasks).193

191. Jacobs & Callaghan, supra note 94, at 1041.
192. Oregon provides the most visible example of this. See Gosia Wozniacka, Oregon
Panel Recommends Moving to Federal Exchange, POST BULL. (Apr. 24, 2014, 9:00 PM),
https://www.postbulletin.com/news/news/nation/oregon-panel-recommends-moving-to-fede
ral-exchange/article_77334f03-8262-5af1-a402-f90b32975000html [https://perma.cc/7TEFDPWG]. Hawaii (now a federally run Exchange) and Nevada (now using a federal platform)
provide additional examples.
193. State insurance commissioners, who predate the Act, admittedly have played a central role in creation of the Exchanges. The extent to which they have operated within familiar state-level administrations in the management of Exchanges, however, has varied
widely. See Haeder & Weimer, supra note 127, at 540–41.
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In sum, the ACA’s experience suggests that one way to ensure
broader uptake of federalism-based programs, and thus more fulsome accomplishment of programmatic goals, is to build upon entrenched administrative structures and statutory programs. Such
buttressing cannot assure success, or ward off legal risk, but does
enhance the chances of a program garnering the political and practical support needed to spread more widely among the states.
V. APPLYING THE LESSONS: FROM HEALTH CARE TO THE GREEN
NEW DEAL
Thus far, we have distilled three structural lessons from the
ACA regarding how to make federalism best work. In this Part, we
illustrate how these lessons can be applied across subject areas to
strengthen the design of federalism-based efforts to improve the
lives of all Americans. To do so, we apply the lessons learned from
the ACA to the dynamic and burgeoning legislative project to create a Green New Deal.
A. The GND: An Overview
At the center of the GND is an insistence that climate change,
economic inequality, and structural racism have common causes
and common solutions, and thus must be addressed in concert.194
This insistence makes the GND different from most climate change
policies, which focus centrally on reducing carbon emissions and
only peripherally, if at all, on issues of distribution.195 The GND
remains at an early stage of development, with its goals plural,
contested, and provisional. That said, a few key blueprints for the
GND have been published, and several members of Congress have
proposed relevant legislation.196 And although President Biden has
194. See, e.g., H.R. Res. 109, 116th Cong. (2019).
195. See Rhiana Gunn-Wright & Robert Hockett, Mobilizing for a Just, Prosperous, and
Sustainable Economy: The Green New Deal 6 (Cornell Legal Studies, Research Paper No.
19-09, 2019) (“The Green New Deal is not, then, a ‘low-ball,’ ‘incrementalist,’ or otherwise
trivial ‘tax and incentive scheme’ meant to ‘nudge’ a few private firms into producing some
modestly beneficial market outcomes for a few privileged people.”).
196. See H.R. Res. 109; Gunn-Wright & Hockett, supra note 195; GREG CARLOCK, EMILY
MANGAN & SEAN MCELWEE, DATA FOR PROGRESS, A GREEN NEW DEAL: A PROGRESSIVE
VISION FOR ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY AND ECONOMIC STABILITY 4 (2018); Community Climate Justice: Governor Inslee’s Plan for Environmental & Economic Justice in an
Inclusive Clean Energy Economy, JAY INSLEE FOR GOVERNOR [hereinafter Community Climate Justice], https://www.jayinslee.com/issues/climate-justice [https://perma.cc/9X43-JU
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disavowed the specific nomenclature of the GND, his platform on
climate change includes many of its key tenets outlined below.197
On the climate change front, the GND is aggressive—and appropriately so. Just as the GND was taking shape, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change released a shocking report suggesting that if the world is to avoid catastrophic levels of warming,
carbon emissions must peak and then begin a rapid decline in just
over a decade.198 The GND takes its carbon emissions reductions
goals from this gold-standard scientific research,199 establishing a
goal of net-zero greenhouse gas emissions by mid-century, with an
electricity grid that runs on “100% clean energy” created even
sooner.200 The GND also calls for upgrading building stock, reducing emissions from manufacturing and agriculture, and “overhauling” transportation systems to focus on public transit and electric
vehicles.201 To ensure that these climate objectives are accompanied by economic and social transformation, the GND also calls for
community ownership of resources, a federal jobs guarantee, and
“high-quality health care” and “affordable, safe, and adequate
KG]; Tackling the Climate Crisis Head On, WARREN DEMOCRATS, https://elizabethwarren.
com/plans/climate-change [https://perma.cc/A3WN-RSGA]; The Green New Deal, BERNIE
SANDERS, https://berniesanders.com/en/issues/green-new-deal/ [https://perma.cc/ADC3-MN
K6].
197. The Biden Plan to Secure Environmental Justice and Equitable Economic Opportunity, BIDEN HARRIS, https://joebiden.com/environmental-justice-plan/ [https://perma.cc/
TSZ5-UPNT]; The Biden Plan for a Clean Energy Revolution and Environmental Justice,
BIDEN HARRIS, https://joebiden.com/climateplan/# [https://perma.cc/JL2U-G5Z8] (including
100 percent clean electricity by 2035, $2 trillion in federal infrastructure spending, and a
dedicated forty percent of all federal green spending targeted to disadvantaged communities). But see David Roberts, What Joe Biden Was Trying to Say About the Green New Deal,
VOX (Oct. 7, 2020, 9:46 PM), https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/21498236/joebiden-green-new-deal-debate [https://perma.cc/F9MD-84M9] (quoting Biden as asserting
during a presidential debate that “The Green New Deal is not my plan”).
198. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, IPCC SPECIAL REPORT ON
GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C, at 7–8 (2018) [hereinafter IPCC REPORT], https://report.ipcc.ch/
sr15/pdf/sr15_spm_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q46A-Z3SV].
199. See H.R. Res. 109, 116th Cong. § 1 (2019) (citing IPCC REPORT, supra note 198).
200. The House Resolution both establishes a net-zero goal and calls for a “10-year national mobilization” to accomplish it—which some have taken to mean that the very challenging goal of net-zero emissions should be reached within a decade. See, e.g., Madeleine
Cuff, Green New Deal Blueprint Targets Net Zero US Emissions in 10 Years,
BUSINESSGREEN (Feb. 7, 2019), https://www.businessgreen.com/bg/news/3070686/greennew-deal-blueprint-targets-net-zero-emissions-in-ten-years [https://perma.cc/7Z9E-4BF7].
This is not, however, the necessary meaning of the language used—which might also support a more gradual timeline. See H.R. Res. 109 §§ 1(A)–(E), 2. Data for Progress—the most
comprehensive blueprint to date—calls for achieving “100% clean” energy by 2035 and netzero emissions by 2050. See CARLOCK ET AL., supra note 196, at 5.
201. See H.R. Res. 109 § 2(E)–(H); see also CARLOCK ET AL., supra note 196, at 8.
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housing” for all Americans as part of the clean energy transition.202
Left unanswered are a host of questions about the technical details
of this transition, including the role of nuclear power and carbon
capture and storage technologies, and whether a carbon tax might
form a component of the GND strategy.203
Many have pushed back at this multi-pronged, capacious approach to climate change policy. Soon after the introduction of the
GND resolution, Speaker Nancy Pelosi dismissed it flippantly:
“The green dream, or whatever they call it, nobody knows what it
is, but they’re for it, right?”204 Fox News whipped up hysteria, covering the GND more than CNN and MSNBC combined,205 and calling it a “disaster,” an “American nightmare,” and most curiously,
a “bird-pocalypse.”206 Others insist that the GND is naïve, overly
ambitious, or just plain wrong for linking climate policy, economic
policy, and social policy—or that there is not possibly the money
available to fund it.207

202. H.R. Res. 109 § 4(E)–(H), (O)(i)–(ii); see also Gunn-Wright & Hockett, supra note
195, at 10 (listing similarly worded goals).
203. See John Cassidy, The Good News About a Green New Deal, NEW YORKER (Mar. 4,
2019), https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/the-good-news-about-a-green-newdeal [https://perma.cc/G3T3-97WT]; Ed Dolan, A Carbon Tax Should Be the Centerpiece of
the Green New Deal, SALON (Mar. 12, 2019, 10:30 PM), https://www.salon.com/2019/03/12/acarbon-tax-should-be-the-centerpiece-of-the-green-new-deal/ [https://perma.cc/S6LV-VQU
M].
204. Chris Cillizza, Nancy Pelosi Just Threw Some Serious Shade at Alexandria OcasioCortez’s ‘Green New Deal,’ CNN POL. (Feb. 8, 2019, 9:29 AM), https://www.cnn.com/20
19/02/07/politics/pelosi-alexandria-ocasio-cortez-green-new-deal/index.html [https://perma.
cc/43VQ-XP3N].
205. Ted MacDonald, Fox News Discussed the Green New Deal More Often than CNN
and MSNBC Combined, MEDIA MATTERS (Apr. 9, 2019, 12:19 PM), https://www.mediamatt
ers.org/blog/2019/04/09/Fox-News-discussed-the-Green-New-Deal-more-often-than-CNN-a
nd-MSNBC-combined/223383 [https://perma.cc/9D3Q-A4D2].
206. Justin Haskins, Green New Deal Would Destroy American Dream, Create American
Nightmare, FOX NEWS (Feb. 17, 2019), https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/green-new-dealwould-destroy-american-dream-create-american-nightmare [https://perma.cc/X7YH-ZF9V];
Stuart Varney, Stuart Varney: The Green New Deal Is a Disaster for Democrats, Too, FOX
NEWS (Mar. 1, 2019), https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/stuart-varney-the-green-new-dealis-a-disaster-for-democrats-too [https://perma.cc/9SWA-YGKH]; Justin Haskins, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez’s Green New Deal Is a Bird-Pocalypse, FOX NEWS (Mar. 9, 2019),
https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/alexandria-ocasio-cortezs-green-new-deal-is-a-bird-pocal
ypse [https://perma.cc/MP4H-9HJ9] (arguing that “it would result in untold millions of birds
being slaughtered by Democrats’ supposedly ‘environmentally friendly’ green energy
sources, including wind farms and solar energy facilities”).
207. See Sean Sweeney, The Green New Deal’s Magical Realism, NEW LAB. F. (Feb.
2019), https://newlaborforum.cuny.edu/2019/02/19/green_new_deal/ [https://perma.cc/A2TR
-JTJR] (describing a “‘war’ between the rising left wing of the Democratic Party . . . and the
party’s pro-market neoliberal mainstream”); Dan Drollette Jr., We Need a Better Green New
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In the face of this opposition, it remains to be seen whether GND
proponents will be able to muster the coalition necessary to achieve
legislative victories. One important structural decision that may
play a key role in these conversations is the extent to which the
GND embraces federalist arrangements, and the manner in which
it does so. GND backers have understandably focused to date on
laying out a broad substantive agenda but have said little about
how such an ambitious set of social programs might be structured.
When structure is mentioned, supporters often reference the original New Deal and World War II mobilization efforts as models.208
However, in many ways, the ACA proves a more apt object of study,
given how much has also changed in the U.S. administrative state
since these earlier models succeeded.
To navigate the entrenched cooperative federalist structures
that pervade U.S. energy and environmental law,209 and which are
now complicated by many “uncooperative” states,210 attention must
be devoted to how to map the GND’s substantive priorities onto the
structure of the modern administrative state. Today, U.S. energy
and environmental law are both deeply federalist in their structures. In environmental law, “cooperative federalism” predominates,211 in which the federal government sets certain minimum
standards for environmental quality and then allows states flexibility in planning for how to meet those standards.212 In energy
Deal—An Economist’s Take, BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS (Mar. 25, 2019), https://thebulletin.org/2019/03/we-need-a-better-green-new-deal-an-economists-take/ [https://perma.cc/W6
GL-K8L8]; Noah Smith, How to Design a Green New Deal That Isn’t Over the Top, SALT
LAKE TRIB. (Feb. 13, 2019, 9:30 AM), https://www.sltrib.com/opinion/commentary/2019/02/1
3noah-smith-how-design/ [https://perma.cc/56C3-AN8J] (“[T]he plan overreaches in its desire to deliver a raft of expensive new entitlements—guaranteed jobs, benefits, health care,
housing, education, income and more.”); Want a Green New Deal? Here’s a Better One.,
WASH. POST (Feb. 24, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/want-a-green-newdeal-heres-a-better-one/2019/02/24/2d7e491c-36d2-11e9-af5b-b51b7ff322e9_story.html?ut
m_term=.7951f66b3a11 [https://perma.cc/AKW2-BD2G] (critiquing these elements of the
GND because “they divert money and attention from the primary mission: rapidly eliminating emissions between now and midcentury”).
208. See Gunn-Wright & Hockett, supra note 195, at 5. (“It is a ‘New Deal’ in the sense
that it works on a scale not seen in our country since the New Deal and World War II mobilizations. . . .”).
209. See sources cited supra note 32.
210. Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE
L.J. 1256, 1258–59 (2009).
211. See sources cited supra note 32.
212. Note that these standards usually form a floor, meaning that states can exceed but
not fall below these requirements. See Adam Babich, Our Federalism, Our Hazardous
Waste, and Our Good Fortune, 54 MD. L. REV. 1516, 1534 (1995) (“The essence of cooperative
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law, the other body of U.S. law central to efforts at rapid decarbonization,213 jurisdiction is less cooperative, but also shared.214 The
Federal Power Act (“FPA”), which has structured relations between the federal and state governments in the field of electricity
since 1935, gives the federal government control over the pricing
of interstate, wholesale electricity sales and interstate transmission lines, but leaves to states control over the retail electricity sector (that is, utility sales of electricity to end-use consumers) and
over electricity generation.215 Similarly, laws about infrastructure
siting give states considerable authority over where and when to
approve new transmission lines, oil pipelines, and electric generation facilities.216
Many states have used their authority under the FPA to respond
aggressively to climate change, filling the federal climate change
policy lacuna with a range of state-level policies.217 A growing number of states now have laws that require decarbonization of the
federalism is that states take primary responsibility for implementing federal standards,
while retaining the freedom to apply their own, more stringent standards.”).
213. In 2018, 26.9 percent of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions came from the electricity
sector, and another twenty-eight percent came from transportation, predominantly from the
burning of fossil fuels in combustion engines. See Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions,
EPA, https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gas-emissions [https://perma
.cc/WDD2-BLQA].
214. Traditionally, courts treated the Federal Power Act (“FPA”) as creating a “bright
line” separation of federal and state sovereign spheres. See, e.g., Fed. Power Comm’n v. S.
Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 215 (1964) (“Congress meant to draw a bright line easily
ascertained, between state and federal jurisdiction.”). However, given the interconnectedness of the modern grid, courts have more recently suggested that the FPA should be read
as a scheme of “collaborative federalism,” in which the federal and state governments must
work together to achieve the ends that are rightfully within the control of each jurisdiction.
See, e.g., Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1300 (2016) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (describing the FPA as a “collaborative federalism” statute); Fed. Energy Reg.
Comm’n v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760, 780 (2016) (describing FERC’s rule as
creating a “program of cooperative federalism”); Coal. for Competitive Elec. v. Zibelman, 906
F.3d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 2018) (describing the FPA as a “collaborative scheme”). Several scholars
have written in detail about this shift. See, e.g., Daniel A. Lyons, Protecting States in the
New World of Energy Federalism, 67 EMORY L.J. 921 (2018); Joel B. Eisen, Dual Electricity
Federalism Is Dead, but How Dead, and What Replaces It?, 8 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY &
ENVTL. L. 3 (2017); Jim Rossi, The Brave New Path of Energy Federalism, 95 TEX. L. REV.
399 (2016).
215. See 16 U.S.C. § 824(a)–(b)(1).
216. See Alexandra B. Klass & Danielle Meinhardt, Transporting Oil and Gas: U.S. Infrastructure Challenges, 100 IOWA L. REV. 947, 948 (2015) (explaining that oil pipelines remain under state control, whereas jurisdiction over gas pipelines is federalized); Alexandra
B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Interstate Transmission Challenges for Renewable Energy:
A Federalism Mismatch, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1801, 1804 (2012) (analyzing how state authority
over transmission impedes renewable energy development).
217. See Database of State Incentives for Renewables & Efficiency, DSIRE, https://www.
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electricity sector on the same aggressive scale contemplated by the
GND.218 However, other states remain intransigent on climate, or
continue to take steps in the wrong direction—such as Ohio’s July
2019 legislation actively promoting coal.219 All to say, hyperpartisanship persists in state climate politics, much as it does in health
care.
One central challenge confronting the architects of the GND will
be how to structure a successful program that takes advantage of
these longstanding federalism arrangements, without succumbing
to their weaknesses.220 On these questions, we believe the ACA offers substantial lessons regarding whether and how—in our contemporary, hyperpartisan times—to effectively build states into
major federal social justice legislation.221
B. Applying the Lessons
1. Federal Funding
There are good reasons—perhaps political above all else—that
the GND might choose to use conditional funding to induce states
to achieve certain priorities, including affordable housing, clean
energy infrastructure development, job creation, and living wages.
dsireusa.org [https://perma.cc/3SUG-GYQ3] (database collecting state incentives on renewable energy and energy efficiency); see also sources cited supra note 6.
218. These states include Hawaii, California, Washington, New Mexico, Nevada, and
New York, with legislation pending in several others (updated June 2019). Phil McKenna,
Washington Commits to 100% Clean Energy and Other States May Follow Suit, INSIDE
CLIMATE NEWS (May 7, 2019), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/07052019/100-percentclean-energy-map-inslee-washington-california-puerto-rico [https://perma.cc/JZ48-B3VR].
219. See Am. Sub. H.R. 6, 133d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2019) (effective Oct. 22,
2019); see also Leah C. Stokes, While the Planet Overheats, Ohio’s Coal Industry Gets a
Bailout, GUARDIAN (July 28, 2019, 10:39 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/jul/28/planet-overheats-ohios-coal-industry-gets-a-bailout [https://perma.cc/MU7
V-NMBA].
220. See William W. Buzbee, Federalism Hedging, Entrenchment, and the Climate Challenge, 6 WIS. L. REV. 1037, 1039–40 (2017) (arguing that “retaining latitude for state and
federal overlap can provide an array of benefits and, especially, reduce risks of disruptive
policy reversals”).
221. We do not intend by this analysis to diminish from the many possible ways that the
GND might embrace a more direct structural relationship between the federal government
and local communities. We limit our attention to that possibility only because the ACA has
the fewest lessons to offer in this regard—such that localism as a GND strategy will have
to draw its moves from other playbooks. In other writing, one of us has been a proponent of
the role that cities can play in transitioning to cleaner energy, and other researchers echo
this possibility. See Shelley Welton, Decarbonization in Democracy, 67 UCLA L. REV. 56
(2020); see also sources cited supra note 6.
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Yet, just as in the health care context, there are real costs to such
arrangements for a program centered on tackling inequality as a
core mission. The same states that would likely prove non-cooperative even in the face of overwhelmingly rational incentives are the
ones where low-income communities and communities of color may
most need assistance.222
To mitigate such risks in conditional funding arrangements,
GND drafters might draw lessons from the ACA’s experience of
backstopping state insurance exchanges with a federal option. Recall that the ACA’s drafters wisely erected a federalist structure in
which states would default to a federal exchange, should they elect
not to run their own.223 A similar strategy might prove useful in
implementing the GND. For example, imagine federal legislation
that provides generous funding to states that adopt clean infrastructure expansion programs, and which also create jobs that pay
a living wage or invest in certain frontline communities.224 That
same legislation might stipulate that, should a state not opt in
within a certain number of years, then the federal government can
design its own infrastructure projects to create such jobs and aid
frontline communities within the state. Similarly, local communities could be empowered to apply directly, in place of the state.225
Alternatively, or in addition, suppose the GND elects to utilize
certain incentive programs to induce private industry’s participation. Legislation could, for example, offer generous loans or grants
to renewables developers who commit to certain job guarantees or
222. On this point, recent research has found a correlation between state-level economic
inequality and carbon emissions, with those states with higher levels of inequality also
ranking as the highest-emitting. See Andrew Jorgensen, Juliet Schor & Xiaorui Huang, Income Inequality and Carbon Emissions in the United States: A State-Level Analysis, 134
ECOLOGICAL ECON. 40, 46 (2017). This study both validates the intuitions of GND proponents that the problems of inequality and climate change are inextricably linked, and suggests the importance of achieving robust state buy-in, if the GND’s goals are to be met.
223. See supra section II.A.
224. See, e.g., Community Climate Justice, supra note 196 (“Guaranteeing 40% or more
of federal investments building a clean energy economy will go to front-line communities
facing greater burdens of pollution, income inequality and climate impacts.”); see also David
Roberts, The 4 Best Ideas from Jay Inslee’s New Climate Justice Plan, VOX (July 30, 2019,
10:50 AM), https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2019/7/30/20731958/jay-insleefor-president-climate-change-justice-plan-green-new-deal [https://perma.cc/9FJ9-LMUT]
(arguing that Inslee’s 170-page climate plan is in fact the best model for GND supporters to
follow).
225. Controversially, such a program might also have to come with an override of state
infrastructure approval and siting authority. See supra note 216 and accompanying text
(regarding states’ jurisdiction over clean energy infrastructure).
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rates of infrastructure development. In that case, the ACA’s less
successful experience with ensuring robust insurance exchanges
instructs that the GND might provide a backstop allocation of
funding to a public option, should private industry prove unwilling
to fully participate.226 If, for example, a pool of money is made
available for clean infrastructure development in frontline communities,227 the GND might stipulate that it reverts to a federal entity
to pursue such projects if not fully utilized by the private sector.
In sum, the experience of the ACA teaches that hyperpartisan
conditions demand new, more complex relationships between the
federal and state governments. Should GND drafters accede to arrangements where states are invited—rather than commanded—
into participation, constructing federal backstops could induce
states to participate on their terms, rather than the federal government’s terms. This participation, in turn, might help states
with varying political conditions approach decarbonization in usefully different ways—all of which might ultimately strengthen nationwide norms in favor of climate action.228
2. Coalition-Building in the GND
The architects of the GND have already thought a lot about coalitions. In particular, considerable attention has focused on getting
labor unions’ support,229 and on ensuring that the program’s design
is a bottom-up collaborative effort, rather than technocratically directed from the top down.230 The ACA’s experience suggests several

226. See supra note 68 (regarding public options).
227. See, e.g., CARLOCK ET AL., supra note 196, at 14; 100% Clean Energy for America:
Governor Jay Inslee’s Plan for 100% Clean Electricity, Vehicles and Buildings, JAY INSLEE
GOVERNOR, https://www.jayinslee.com/issues/100clean [https://perma.cc/FZJ8-Y7UJ].
228. See Michael A. Livermore, The Perils of Experimentation, 126 YALE L.J. 636, 638
(2017) (arguing that policy experimentation on climate will allow different political ideologies to select different sets of policies, thereby potentially defusing some resistance).
229. Bob Massie, Unions Are Finally Learning to Love the Green New Deal, NATION (July
12, 2019), https://www.thenation.com/article/green-new-deal-unions/ [https://perma.cc/U6
FJ-2PVG]; Umair Irfan, The Green New Deal Is Fracturing a Critical Base for Democrats:
Unions, VOX (June 19, 2019, 9:24 AM), https://www.vox.com/2019/5/22/18628299/greennew-deal-labor-union-2020-democrats [https://perma.cc/RCF4-NA3J].
230. See H.R. Res. 109, 116th Cong. (2019) (“[A] Green New Deal must be developed
through transparent and inclusive consultation, collaboration, and partnership with frontline and vulnerable communities, labor unions, worker cooperatives, civil society groups,
academia, and businesses . . . .”).
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more cross-partisan partners that the GND drafters might consider as they structure legislation. To be sure, creating cross-partisan coalitions on climate change and redistribution may prove
more challenging than health care—Republicans at least believe
that health care is real.231 But just as the ACA enlisted certain
partners within the business community and within state government, so could the GND. The burgeoning renewable energy sector
has already proven capable of thriving in Republican-controlled
states, some of which see in it considerable economic potential.232
As Jonathan Gilligan and Michael Vandenbergh have traced, several powerful tech companies have also been allies of clean energy.233 These companies have pushed southern and western states
to invest in clean technologies that they have otherwise resisted in
exchange for the companies agreeing to locate major operations in
these states.234 The housing, real estate, and construction industries, too, might see considerable upside in a project that focused
on the need to retrofit buildings and to invest in new, more efficient
housing stock—particularly if such a program took an incentive
form rather than a mandate (another argument, then, in favor of
conditional spending arrangements).
There are, of course, risks to structuring a statute to curry corporate favor if it conflicts with its core social justice mission. Indeed, the ACA’s structure itself—which built upon the private insurance industry rather than displacing it—might be a testament
231. Many Republicans still disclaim anthropogenic causes to climate change, although
the numbers are shifting. See ANTHONY LEISEROWITZ, EDWARD MAIBACH, CONNIE ROSERRENOUF, SETH ROSENTHAL, MATTHEW CUTLER & JOHN KOTCHER, POLITICS & GLOBAL
WARMING, MARCH 2018 (2018), https://climatecommunication.yale.edu/publications/polit
ics-global-warming-march-2018/2/ [https://perma.cc/JL59-YBQG] (finding that “55% of liberal/moderate Republicans (14 percentage points higher than in October 2017), but only
26% of conservative Republicans” think that “global warming is caused mostly by human
activities”).
232. See Emma Hibbard, Green Energy in Red States, CLIMABLE BLOG (Sept. 4, 2018),
https://climable.org/blog/2018/9/4/green-energy-in-red-states [https://perma.cc/HBT9-BDV
N]; Eric Biber, Cultivating a Green Political Landscape: Lessons for Climate Change Policy
from the Defeat of California’s Proposition 23, 66 VAND. L. REV. 399, 402 (2013) (documenting how climate “winners” have helped to build coalitions that advance ever-tougher climate
policies); Buzbee, supra note 220, at 1044 (arguing that “entrenchment of supportive coalitions through a process of path dependence dynamics [can] result in ‘increasing returns’ and
‘costs of exit’”).
233. MICHAEL P. VANDENBERGH & JONATHAN M. GILLIGAN, BEYOND POLITICS: THE
PRIVATE GOVERNANCE RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE 138–44, 211–12 (2017) (describing
how firms with roots on the U.S. west coast, including Amazon, Google, and Facebook, are
greening their southwestern data centers).
234. See id.
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to such risks.235 Nevertheless, the ACA points to some realities
about the benefits of pitting certain corporate interests against
others in the structure of the Act, so as to have powerful partners
that might break down resistance in hostile state governments.
Additionally, the ACA’s experience regarding relative levels of
support within state government suggests that the GND might be
wise to enlist the support of state environmental regulators in particular. These regulators might be more inclined to pursue vigorous implementation than other state agencies, particularly, state
public utility commissions, which in Republican-controlled states
have been fairly resistant to prioritizing climate change.236 Ultimately, the key lesson is this: to the extent that the GND embraces
federalism as a strategy, thinking hard about not just the coalitions necessary to win passage, but also to drive implementation,
will be one way to boost success.
3. Entrenchment and the GND
Finally, the ACA has important lessons to offer the GND with
respect to entrenchment—that is, the wisdom of building upon existing federalist programs. As in the case of the ACA, there may be
limited legal benefits to building off an entrenched program.237 The
Clean Air Act has already proven an unreliable vehicle for delivering climate policy and is likely to remain so. 238 Nevertheless, the
ACA suggests several ways in which political and administrative
235. There is an ongoing intra-party rift among Democrats about whether “Medicare for
All” or expansion of the ACA should be a legislative priority. See Kevin Uhrmacher, Kevin
Schaul, Paulina Firozi & Jeff Stein, Where 2020 Democrats Stand on Health Care, WASH.
POST. (updated Apr. 8, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/policy-20
20/medicare-for-all/ [https://perma.cc/MD5K-YQXH].
236. See John A. Sautter & Kari Twaite, A Fractured Climate? The Political Economy of
Public Utility Commissions in an Age of Climate Change, 22 ELECTRICITY J. 68, 69 (2009)
(finding carbon emissions to be much higher in states that elect their public utility commissioners); cf. Sharon B. Jacobs, The Statutory Separation of Powers, 129 YALE L.J. 378, 381
(2019) (exploring the implications of the delegatory choices Congress makes among and between agencies).
237. See supra section V.A.
238. Indeed, given the current disregard for settled precedent, one could even imagine a
lawsuit over the statute’s definition of an “air pollutant,” seemingly decided in Massachusetts v. EPA. See 549 U.S. 497, 528–29, 559–60 (2007) (finding that the Clean Air Act’s definition of “air pollutant” unambiguously includes greenhouse gases). The Supreme Court
has since narrowed the Clean Air Act’s application to greenhouse gases. See Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 316 (2014) (finding that “air pollutant” does not mean the
same thing under other provisions of the statute, and does not have to include greenhouse
gases for purposes of those provisions).
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entrenchment might redound to the benefit of the GND, if it is built
on the shoulders of preexisting and largely successful programs.
Two GND proposals advanced thus far explicitly rely on preexisting federalism arrangements as building blocks for decarbonization policy.239 First, mirroring the Clean Air Act’s longstanding federalist structure,240 one recently proposed House bill calls for
Congress to establish an aggressive nationwide decarbonization
trajectory, and then requires states to submit plans to meet this
trajectory—with the inducement of federal funding as an incentive
for compliance.241 Similarly, several have suggested that the GND
could be centered around a federal “Clean Energy Standard,” based
on popular state-level laws that require utilities to source an increasing percentage of their electricity from renewable or clean energy sources.242 Twenty-nine states and Washington, D.C. currently have their own “Renewable Portfolio Standard,” which vary
in stringency from 2.5 percent renewable energy by 2021 in South
Carolina, to 100 percent by 2045 in Hawaii, California, Washington, and New Mexico.243
Building off either of these preexisting arrangements obviously
carries risks and rewards. GND architects will want to harness
leading states’ climate progress without allowing laggard states to
thwart the programs’ aims. And they will want to build legislation
that proves durable in the face of changes in administration.244 On
239. Both of these potential policy vehicles are suggested in CARLOCK ET AL., supra note
196, at 5–6.
240. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7407–7410; see also Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 249
(1976) (describing the feature of using state implementation plans as the “heart” of the
Clean Air Act); Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Air Quality Protection Using State Implementation
Plans—Thirty-Seven Years of Increasing Complexity, 15 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 209, 211 (2004).
241. Memorandum from Frank Pallone, Jr., Chairman, Comm’n on Energy & Commerce,
The CLEAN Future Act (Jan. 2020), https://energycommerce.house.gov/sites/democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/files/documents/CLEAN%20Future%20Act%20Memo.pdf [https://
perma.cc/475Y-XK98].
242. “Clean energy” standards typically denote programs that include sources that are
carbon-free, but not technically renewable—most notably, nuclear power. See, e.g., S. 100 §
5, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018) (defining eligible resources for the state’s 100 percent
clean energy goal to include “zero-carbon resources”).
243. See Renewable & Clean Energy Standards, DSIRE (June 2019), http://ncsolarcenprod.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/RPS-CES-June2019.pdf [https://perm
a.cc/HLG7-SJJV]; see also Lincoln L. Davies, State Renewable Portfolio Standards: Is There
a “Race” and Is It “To the Top,” 3 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 3, 5–6 (2012) [hereinafter Davies, State Renewable Portfolio Standards] (noting that thirty-seven states total
have renewable standards or goals).
244. See Buzbee, supra note 220, at 1045 (emphasizing the importance of durability);
Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present
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all of these topics, the experience of the ACA helps bring into focus
the tradeoffs of using federalist structures to accomplish social justice ends.
Both the ACA’s implementation story and past experience with
climate regulations also teach that lawsuits, heel-dragging, and
non-cooperation should be expected on the part of states, no matter
what program is used. Nevertheless, the ACA’s experience with
Medicare expansion suggests that the relative amount of state
pushback—and the possibility of repeal during subsequent administrations—might be lessened by using a familiar vehicle for delivering decarbonization.245 Despite a partisan divide over climate
change, Americans like clean air and appreciate what the Clean
Air Act has done in delivering it.246 Similarly, Renewable Portfolio
Standards have proven to be a policy capable of crossing red–blue
lines, drawing on widespread American support for renewable energy.247 If patterns hold for climate as they did in health care, then
crafting a rapid decarbonization mandate as an extension of one of
these programs is likely to enhance popular support, as compared
to starting from scratch. Indeed, states leading on climate policy
may be more supportive of a GND if they see it as building upon,
rather than threatening, their climate leadership.248
The ACA’s lessons with respect to administrative entrenchment—that is, the programmatic and administrative benefits of
building upon an existing program—suggest that the framers of
to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1157, 1159 (2009) (similar).
245. Cf. Buzbee, supra note 220, at 1053 (arguing that cooperative federalism is particularly useful “[w]here a market, regulation, and regulatory progress are interdependent—
as they long have been in utility and energy regulation and are today with climate regulation”).
246. See David Roberts, New Poll: The Public Trusts EPA, Loves the Clean Air Act, and
Wants Congress to Butt Out, GRIST (Feb. 17, 2011), https://grist.org/climate-policy/2011-0216-public-trusts-epa-loves-clean-air-act-wants-congress-to-butt-out/ [https://perma.cc/XPT3
-PPGR]; Alan H. Lockwood, How the Clean Air Act Has Saved $22 Trillion in Health-Care
Costs, ATLANTIC (Sept. 7, 2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/09/howthe-clean-air-act-has-saved-22-trillion-in-health-care-costs/262071/ [https://perma.cc/47487NDM].
247. See STEPHEN ANSOLABEHERE & DAVID M. KONISKY, CHEAP AND CLEAN: HOW
AMERICANS THINK ABOUT ENERGY IN THE AGE OF GLOBAL WARMING 1–6, 9 (2014) (documenting Americans’ widespread preference for clean energy across political parties and geographies).
248. See Gabriel Pacyniak, Making the Most of Cooperative Federalism: What the Clean
Power Plan Has Already Achieved, 29 GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. 301, 332 (2017) (describing how
states pushed to ensure that the Obama administration’s Clean Power Plan, created to
tackle climate change under the Clean Air Act, meshed with preexisting state decarbonization strategies).
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the GND might reap the most benefit by requiring state decarbonization plans. As with the ACA’s experience of Medicaid expansion,
under the Clean Air Act each state already has an agency that is
adept at designing and enforcing state implementation plans for
air quality.249 To be sure, it may be more of a stretch to ask these
state administrators to extend their expertise to climate change
than it was to ask state Medicaid administrators to extend coverage to an additional population. But the novelty of designing climate change regulation is tempered by the fact that most states at
least began planning for compliance with the Obama administration’s now-defunct Clean Power Plan to address climate
change250—a process that exposed these state regulators to the options and challenges for designing state-level decarbonization policy.
A Clean Energy Standard would have fewer, but still some, administrative entrenchment benefits. Given that twenty-nine states
already have implementation experience, there would be readily
transferable lessons and models to guide implementation in the remaining twenty-one states. Moreover, many of these programs
track compliance through regional technology platforms, which
might easily be extended to include other states within the same
regional energy markets.251 For all of these reasons, theories of administrative entrenchment—verified under hyperpartisan conditions by the ACA’s experience—provide modest support for structuring the GND’s decarbonization mandate as an outgrowth of the
Clean Air Act’s state implementation plans or state renewable
portfolio standards. Especially given the stringent implementation
timelines contemplated by the GND, a ready-made administrative
apparatus operating at the state level might provide real benefits
for rapid decarbonization.
There are also implementation risks to using state carbon plans
or a Clean Energy Standard structure as a cornerstone, similar to
those Medicaid expansion has faced through the creative use of
249. See Find a State or Local Agency, NACAA, http://www.4cleanair.org/agencies
[https://perma.cc/9ESY-4HFH].
250. See Pacyniak, supra note 248, at 348 (noting that most states that opposed the
Clean Power Plan in court still began planning for eventual state-level implementation—
although, of course, we cannot know if they ultimately would have filed the requisite state
implementation plans).
251. See ROBIN QUARRIER & DAVID FARNSWORTH, CTR. FOR RES. SOL’NS, TRACKING
RENEWABLE ENERGY FOR THE U.S. EPA’S CLEAN POWER PLAN 5–8 (2014).
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waivers. One risk comes from the flexibility that these programs
might give to states in crafting their compliance strategies. Under
state-level portfolio standards, certain states have chosen to leniently define what counts as “renewable” in order to favor local industries—even though researchers have raised questions about
the sustainability of certain “clean” energy sources, including hog
waste, poultry waste, and forest products.252 Drafters of the GND
would thus want to think carefully about what bounds to place on
states’ discretion in designing decarbonization plans. It can be
tricky to parse “good” state experimentation from “bad,”253 but the
ACA’s experience of waivers shows how many efforts to “experiment” may in fact be efforts to water down federal mandates. Accordingly, drafters of a federal decarbonization scheme that utilizes state implementation plans or state-determined portfolios
should define with some rigor at the federal level the criteria that
allow a resource to count as “clean,” and should establish robust
monitoring and verification schemes to ensure that claimed carbon
pollution reduction efforts translate into reductions in practice.254

252. See Davies, State Renewable Portfolio Standards, supra note 243, at 14, 24–26 (describing divergences among state standards); Lincoln L. Davies, Power Forward: The Argument for a National RPS, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1339, 1361 (2010); see also MD. CODE ANN., PUB.
UTIL. § 7-701(j), (l) (defining poultry litter, which is used in thermal biomass systems); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 62-133.8(e) (establishing a specific requirement for swine waste); David Anderson, Harford Environmental Advocates Push to Remove Chicken Waste as Alternative
Energy Source, BALT. SUN (Nov. 24, 2015, 5:19 PM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/maryland/harford/aegis/ph-ag-chicken-manure-energy-protest-1127-20151124-story.html [https:
//perma.cc/RV2M-SY5H]; Andrew Steer & Craig Hanson, Biofuels Are Not a Green Alternative to Fossil Fuels, GUARDIAN (Jan. 29, 2015. 9:06 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/en
vironment/2015/jan/29/biofuels-are-not-the-green-alternative-to-fossil-fuels-they-are-soldas [https://perma.cc/Y4MM-TS8T]; Elizabeth Ouzts, Hog Waste-to-Gas: Renewable Energy
or More Hot Air?, ENVTL. HEALTH NEWS (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.ehn.org/turning-pigand-hog-farms-waste-into-biogas-2505936626.html [https://perma.cc/VK9Y-GK6U]; Sara
Peach, What to Do About Pig Poop? North Carolina Fights a Rising Tide, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC
(Oct. 30, 2014), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/10/141028-hog-farms-wast
e-pollution-methane-north-carolina-environment/ [https://perma.cc/D49Q-6JM8].
253. See Livermore, supra note 228, at 638 (illustrating how decentralized policy experimentation “can be a mixed blessing that brings mischief along with insight,” such that “policy learning is not an unalloyed advantage of decentralization”); see also Hannah J. Wiseman & Dave Owen, Federal Laboratories of Democracy, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1119, 1121–
22 (2018) (arguing that experimentation does and should occur at the federal level as well).
254. See Michael Wara, Measuring the Clean Development Mechanism’s Performance
and Potential, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1759, 1781 (2008) (explaining how the international climate
regime has suffered from “strategic manipulation”); Holly Doremus, Adapting to Climate
Change with Law That Bends Without Breaking, 2 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 45,
54 (2010) (“The most powerful way to combat slippage is to erect sturdy, inflexible oak-like
mandates.”).
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Alternatively, these risks may counsel in favor of designing an entirely federalized Clean Energy Standard, which might harness
the political popularity of similar state-level policies without the
costs of allowing continued state implementation.
There is, however, a deeper political risk to building the GND
upon one of these entrenched programs that must be acknowledged, and is absent in the health care context. The ACA’s Medicaid expansion was a (seemingly) straightforward extension of
preexisting programs to new populations. The GND, in contrast,
seeks to accomplish something quite different with environmental
policy, by integrating it with efforts to combat inequality. Accordingly, there could be supporters of the GND who feel alienated by
the choice of building upon preexisting structures that have not
previously focused on distributive justice.255 But the ACA’s experience at least suggests real political and administrative benefits
from using multiple preexisting structures, including environmental, housing, and health agencies, to tackle these multifaceted
goals, rather than designing new programs or agencies from
scratch.
These risks could also be mitigated through complementary efforts to broaden existing agencies’ missions to more overtly include
distributive justice. As an example of what such efforts might resemble, Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and then-Senator Kamala Harris introduced a “Climate Equity Act” in July 2019,
which would require all climate and environmental bills to have an
“equity scor[e],” and would create an oversight office to ensure
agencies’ more intentional consideration of equity in climate and
environmental rules and regulations.256 These kinds of reforms,

255. There is at least a weak environmental justice mandate in federal environmental
law, as Executive Order 12,898 instructs agencies to “identif[y] and address[] . . . [the] disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects of [their] . . . activities on minority populations and low-income populations . . . .” Exec. Order No. 12,898,
59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 16, 1994). But there is an entire field of environmental justice devoted to understanding why environmental law, on the whole, has produced disparate impacts that have not brought as many gains—and in some cases, have concentrated harms—
in low-income communities and communities of color. See, e.g., ROBERT D. BULLARD,
DUMPING IN DIXIE: RACE, CLASS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (3d ed. 2000); LUKE W.
COLE & SHEILA R. FOSTER, FROM THE GROUND UP: ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM AND THE RISE
OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT (2001).
256. Valerie Volcovici, Harris, Ocasio-Cortez Float Plan to Lift Low-Income Communities
in Climate Plans, REUTERS (July 29, 2019, 3:58 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/ususa-congress-climatechange/harris-ocasio-cortez-float-plan-to-lift-low-income-communities
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which would (if adopted and enforced) percolate through traditional energy and environmental administration, could help alleviate concerns about using entrenched environmental federalist
structures to accomplish decarbonization under the GND.
CONCLUSION
A decade after its passage, the ACA’s reach is far from complete
and its legal future remains precarious. Yet gains continue to be
made on the statute’s goal of bringing health insurance to all
Americans, as Republican states under mounting internal political
pressure slowly creep into the statute’s folds. Given its accretive,
decidedly nonlinear path to increasing health care coverage, the
ACA offers particularly important lessons for modern legislative
drafters who want their programs not only to pass, but to succeed
throughout implementation. In both its strengths and weaknesses,
the ACA’s experience is telling with respect to the possibilities and
challenges of making federalism work to achieve social justice
goals under contemporary hyperpartisan conditions.
We have argued here that the decade of ACA implementation
has revealed important lessons for statutory design with respect to
federal funding, modern coalition-building strategies, and the benefits and costs of building new programs on the backs of entrenched
ones. And we have sketched how these lessons might be applied in
other contexts, using the astoundingly ambitious GND agenda as
a case study in how to usefully translate the ACA’s lessons into
other social justice fields.
These lessons may not be enough to achieve progress across
many issues in the current gridlocked Congress, or to ensure durability under the vicissitudes of the current Supreme Court.
Thoughtful statutory structure cannot cure all woes. But if and
when social justice legislation of the scope and scale of the ACA or
GND is on the table again, these lessons may help to build new
statutory structures that spread as widely as is possible in our current hyperpartisan, federalist climate.

-in-climate-plans-idUSKCN1UO259 [https://perma.cc/GW6E-M9YY]; Comment Submissions for the Climate Equity Act, CONGRESSWOMAN ALEXANDRIA OCASIO-CORTEZ, https://oca
sio-cortez.house.gov/climateequityact [https://perma.cc/HZ38-7WKG].

